The Rwanda-US Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) was signed in Kigali in 2008 and the United States Senate unanimously approved the treaty on September 26, 2011. Meanwhile, the EAC-US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) was signed in July 2008 between USTR and the EAC. In addition, the EAC Common Market Protocol (CMP) to which Rwanda is a member came into force into force on 1st July 2010.
The Rwanda-US BIT is the first to be concluded between the US and a sub-Saharan African country since 1998 (when a BIT was signed with Mozambique). Although there are over 40 BITs in force to which the US is a Party, this Treaty with Rwanda is only the second concluded on the basis of the ambitious 2004 U.S. model BIT. Other African countries with BITs currently in force with the US include: DRC, The Congo, Morocco, Senegal, Egypt, Cameroon and Tunisia. The BIT with Rwanda will remain in force for ten years after its entry into force and will continue in force unless terminated by a Party by providing one year’s advance notice to the other Party.
The Rwanda-US BIT is the first to be concluded between the US and a sub-Saharan African country since 1998 (when a BIT was signed with Mozambique). Although there are over 40 BITs in force to which the US is a Party, this Treaty with Rwanda is only the second concluded on the basis of the ambitious 2004 U.S. model BIT. Other African countries with BITs currently in force with the US include: DRC, The Congo, Morocco, Senegal, Egypt, Cameroon and Tunisia. The BIT with Rwanda will remain in force for ten years after its entry into force and will continue in force unless terminated by a Party by providing one year’s advance notice to the other Party.
The BIT provides investors with legal protections which include non-discriminatory treatment of investors and investments and the right to freely transfer investment-related funds. Unlike the EAC CMP however, the BIT also provides for prompt, adequate, and effective compensation in the event of an expropriation; freedom from specified performance requirements, such as domestic content or technology transfer requirements; and provisions to ensure transparency in governance. The BIT also gives investors in all sectors the right to bring investment disputes to neutral international arbitration panels.
In comparison, EAC CMP Article 29 on the Protection of Cross-Border Investments, undertakes to protect investors and their returns in a non-discriminatory manner however the modalities for doing so are not yet finalised. Article 29:3 proposes that within 2 years after the coming into force of the CMP, Partner States will take measures to ensure necessary protections in the Community.
In contrast, the EAC-US TIFA establishes a EAC-US Council On Trade and Investment to monitor trade, identify and remove impediments to trade and investment.
In contrast, the EAC-US TIFA establishes a EAC-US Council On Trade and Investment to monitor trade, identify and remove impediments to trade and investment.
The BIT contains provisions on National Treatment and Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment whereby it protects investors of a Party and their covered investments from discriminatory measures by the other Party during the full life-cycle of an investment, including the establishment phase. Each Party commits to provide to investors of the other Party and to their covered investments treatment no less favorable than that which it provides, in like circumstances, to its own investors (National Treatment) or to investors from any third country and their investments (MFN Treatment). In this instance, Rwanda has committed in the BIT to give US investors similar treatment it is providing to EAC Partner States, in like circumstances, under the Common Market Protocol.
In contrast however, the EAC CMP Article 13 on the Right of Establishment, EAC States have committed to the principle of MFN but not the principle of National Treatment. However in Article 16 on the Free Movement of Services, the principles of MFN and National Treatment are addressed. Hence National Treatment is applicable in the EAC CMP for investment in the services sectors but seemingly not investment in industrial sectors e.g. agriculture, manufacturing, hunting, and forestry, mining and quarrying, energy production/transmission and distribution.
On Transfers, the BIT has free transfer obligations which require that a Party permit capital and other transfers related to an investment be made freely both into and out of its territory. Additionally, a Party must permit transfers to be made in a ‘‘freely usable currency,’’ as designated by the IMF, at the market rate prevailing at the time of the transfer. Parties may however prevent transfers through the equitable and non-discriminatory application of certain laws. The EAC CMP on the other hand has provisions on the Free Movement of Capital Articles 24-28 which corresponds to the CMP Schedule on the Removal of Restrictions on Free Movement of Capital (Annex VI).
On Performance Requirements, the BIT prohibits the imposition by the Parties of several requirements relating to the performance of investments, including a requirement to achieve a given level of exports or domestic content or requirements linking the value of imports or domestic sales by an investment to the level of its export or foreign exchange earnings. The Article also prohibits Parties from offering advantages, such as tax holidays, in exchange for a more limited set of performance requirements. In the WTO context, the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) takes a similar prohibitive approach however only in the context of trade in goods.
So as not to place U.S. and Rwandan investors at a competitive disadvantage, the disciplines on performance requirements also apply to all investments in the territory (non-discrimination) of a Party, including those owned or controlled by host-country investors (domestic investors) and those owned by non-Parties. The EAC CMP does not impose performance requirements however it would seem that by virtue of the BIT, Rwanda cannot impose such measures even in the services sectors vis a vie any third Party. In practice, Rwanda may want as a policy to impose some performance requirements e.g. the technology transfer in targeted sectors, vis a vie more developed countries and justifiably so, in order to meet key development objectives. This provision is therefore not in the interest of Rwanda given her level of development. It should be mentioned that the development of China is linked to performance requirements (local content) the Chinese government put in place for foreign investors. See related piece here. Fortunately however Rwanda has exempted performance requirements in her Annex II on non conforming measures (discussed below).
On Senior Management and Boards of Directors, the BIT prohibits measures requiring that persons of any particular nationality be appointed to senior management positions in a covered investment. A Party may require that a majority of the board of directors of a covered investment be of a particular nationality, or that a director be a resident of the host country, so long as such requirements do not materially impair an investor’s control over its investment. This provision would prevent Rwanda from implementing broad-based local empowerment policy to foster development of its own nationals into senior management positions and fortunately Rwanda exempted this in her list of non conforming measures (discussed below). Meanwhile in this context, the EAC CMP does not discipline the composition of Boards of Directors and the nationality of Senior Management by virtue of the principles of free movement of workers and right of establishment. The CMP only requires that juridical persons be established in accordance with the national laws of a Partner State.
In the Publication of Laws and Decisions the provisions in the BIT seek to promote transparency in the legal framework governing investment. It requires the Parties to ensure that laws, regulations, procedures, administrative rulings of general application, and adjudicatory decisions that relate to any matter covered by the Treaty are promptly published or otherwise made publicly available. The EAC CMP contains a mildly similar provision in the Free Movement of Services chapter Article 19 whereby notification is required but not publication and the notification only applies after the introduction of the measure.
In the BIT, each Party is obligated, to the extent possible, to publish in advance any laws, regulations, procedures, or administrative rulings of general application with respect to matters covered by the Treaty that the Party proposes to adopt, and to provide interested persons and the other Party a reasonable opportunity to comment on the proposed measures. In the EAC CMP, provisions on advance publication and comments are not addressed. In practice this means that the US would have the opportunity to view, comment and make recommendations in advance, on Rwanda's proposed laws and regulations however EAC Partner States would not.
On the rules of origin (Denial of Benefits) the BIT establishes that a Party may deny the benefits of the Treaty to an investor of the other Party if persons of a third country own or control the enterprise and the denying Party either (1) has no diplomatic relations with the third country; or (2) adopts or maintains measures, such as foreign policy sanctions, with respect to the third country or to a person of the third country that prohibit transactions with the enterprise or that would be violated or circumvented if the benefits of the Treaty were accorded to the enterprise or to its investments. This provision impacts on third Parties that are on sanctioned lists of either Party.
The provisions on Denial of Benefits also establishes that a Party may deny the benefits of the Treaty to an investor of the other Party if the enterprise has no substantial business activities in the territory of the other Party and persons of a third country, or of the denying Party, own or control the enterprise.
The Agreement also lists Non-Conforming Measures (equivalent to negative lists) and in these Annexes, each Party lists existing measures to which any or all of four key obligations of the Treaty do not apply, and sectors or activities in which each Party reserves the right to adopt future measures to which any or all of those obligations will not apply. Annex III of the BIT is reserved for financial services NCMs.
Rwanda: Exemption from MFN and National treatment in all sectors to allow for differential minimum capital requirements for investment registration. Here Rwanda identifies "local investors" to include Rwandese and COMESA investors who are entitled to a lower capital threshold (USD 100,000) than "foreign investors" (USD 250,000). While EAC is not mentioned in the BIT given the common market was not yet in place, one can argue that the EAC falls in the "local investor" category since the common market is technically working towards a single market.
United States: Atomic Energy; Mining; Air Transportation; Customs Brokers; Radiocommunications Licenses; and restrictions on securities registration and OPIC insurance eligibility.
Annex II
Rwanda: Preferences for socially or economically disadvantaged communities and differential treatment pursuant to existing international treaties. Here Rwanda reserves the right to adopt measures in all sectors that are not consistent with the provisions on National Treatment, Performance Requirements and Senior Management and Boards of Directors in order to accord rights or preferences to socially or economically disadvantaged communities.
Rwanda also reserves the right in all sectors to deviate from MFN provisions in order to adopt or maintain any measure that accord differential treatment to countries under any bilateral or multilateral international agreement in force or signed before the BIT. For agreements signed or in force after the date of entry into force of BIT, Rwanda reserved the right to deviate from MFN treatment with regard to: (a) aviation; (b) fisheries; and (c) telecommunications.
Rwanda also reserves the right in all sectors to deviate from MFN provisions in order to adopt or maintain any measure that accord differential treatment to countries under any bilateral or multilateral international agreement in force or signed before the BIT. For agreements signed or in force after the date of entry into force of BIT, Rwanda reserved the right to deviate from MFN treatment with regard to: (a) aviation; (b) fisheries; and (c) telecommunications.
United States: Radio/Satellite Communications, Cable Television, Social Services, Minority Affairs, measures relating to U.S.-flagged maritime vessels, and differential treatment pursuant to existing international treaties.
Annex III
Rwanda: On insurance, Rwanda states that the entry shall cease to have effect on the earlier of: (i) the date that Rwanda enacts an insurance law that eliminates the non-conforming aspects of the measure as set forth above;' or (ii) September 1, 2009.
United States: Financial Services/Banking, Insurance, and general Financial Services.
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Overall the US has more detailed sector specific Non Conforming Measures than Rwanda especially in the services sectors (transport (maritime, aviation), communication (audio visual, telecom), financial services (banking, insurance and other financial services). However Rwanda also made useful exemptions but at a sectoral level made general carve-outs in insurance, aviation, telecommunications and fisheries.
The key take away from this comparison is the Rwanda-US BIT is highly asymmetrical and is more ambitious than the EAC CMP. Theoretically it can prejudice the regional processes given its objectives of MFN, National Treatment, Dispute Settlement (including Expropriation, Compensation), Intrusion in Law Making Processes (governance) and broad-based elimination of: performance requirements, empowerment measures including elimination of legitimate development oriented requirements for foreign investment and repatriation.
Whether such comprehensive coverage is desirable for African countries is an important question, the answer to which is highly context- and situation-specific, and needs to be assessed against the overall objective of ensuring that investment treaties promote investment that actually exists or has the compelling potential to exist and that fosters sustainable development. The propensities to invest and hence the need for protection through an ambitious BIT is an important consideration before signing BITs as such needs may change over time. In closing its important to note that several countries receiving high FDI receipts in Africa e.g. Angola, Sudan have very few BITs and in a previous post we found that strict FDI provisions in BITs do not increase investment.
Whether such comprehensive coverage is desirable for African countries is an important question, the answer to which is highly context- and situation-specific, and needs to be assessed against the overall objective of ensuring that investment treaties promote investment that actually exists or has the compelling potential to exist and that fosters sustainable development. The propensities to invest and hence the need for protection through an ambitious BIT is an important consideration before signing BITs as such needs may change over time. In closing its important to note that several countries receiving high FDI receipts in Africa e.g. Angola, Sudan have very few BITs and in a previous post we found that strict FDI provisions in BITs do not increase investment.
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