Showing posts with label COMESA. Show all posts
Showing posts with label COMESA. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 18, 2015

Tripartite FTA COMESA-EAC-SADC Launched

The Tripartite FTA has been launched and encompasses 26 Member/Partner States from the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), with a combined population of 625 million people and a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of USD 1.2 trillion, will account for half of the membership of the African Union and 58% of the continent’s GDP.

The Tripartite FTA popularly known as the Grand Free Trade Area, is the largest economic bloc on the continent and the launching pad for the establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) according to the Abuja Treaty by 2017. This might be accomplished possibly by the Tripartite FTA negotiating with ECOWAS. 

The Tripartite FTA offers significant opportunities for business and investment within the Tripartite and will act as a magnet for attracting foreign direct investment into the Tripartite region. The business community, in particular, will benefit from an improved and harmonized trade regime which reduces the cost of doing business as a result of elimination of overlapping trade regimes due to multiple memberships. 

The launching of the Tripartite Free Trade Area is the first phase of implementing a developmental regional integration strategy that places high priority on infrastructure development, industrialization and free movement of business persons. Integration under the Tripartite is a developmental process with infrastructure development, industrial development and market integration as three critical, interdependent pillars. The second phase of negotiations, should address liberalization in services, movement of people, investment, as well as competition policy and intellectual property rights, and is yet to be undertaken.

For full copies of documents check here

Monday, November 18, 2013

Kenya's Sugar Sector and COMESA Safeguards

According to sources, Kenya’s sugar sector faces a gloomy future as the end of the COMESA safeguards beckons.


In March 2004, the government requested a four-year cover that was granted with conditions from the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) council of ministers. However, Kenya is yet to meet any of the conditions, and the government now indicates it will be seeking another extension when the current one ends March 2014.

Agriculture secretary Felix Koskei says the government i
s keen on an extension of the protection. “We will explain to COMESA why we need an extension; we understand that we have exhausted our limits, but we still have the reasons to be given one more extension,” says Mr Koskei.

Kenya has exhausted the required allowance for the extensions as put in place by the COMESA treaty, and it is not clear whether the window will be extended.  The cover came into effect in 2003 and Kenya was given a four-year waiver that would see the importation of duty-free sugar from the COMESA market regulated. Kenya got extensions in 2007 and in 2011. Initially, the treaty would provide for a maximum of eight years, however, the waiver in December 2007 was amended to avoid contravening COMESA Trade Remedy Regulation which provide for a maximum eight years for the application of safeguards under the bloc’s terms.  COMESA reviewed the regulations to be in tandem with the World Trade Organisation’s agreement on safeguards which provides for a total of 10 years for developing economies.

A former chairman with the Kenya Sugar Board (KSB) and currently a director at the agency says political will shall override the COMESA treaty on the protection.  “At the end of the day, political will shall prevail over the treaty; each member country has own interest of protecting their sugar sectors which provides a source of livelihood for more than a million people,” says Mr Saulo Busolo.  Kenya is considered a large-scale consumer of industrial sugar, used in making cakes, sweets and pharmaceutical products, which are later sold within COMESA.  Mr Busolo says Kenyan consumers are paying exorbitant prices for sugar as a result of shielding the local manufacturers from increased competition from neighboring African nations.  “Consumers are parting with high prices in buying sugar compared to other African countries such as Mauritius,” he said, adding that Kenyans were paying more than two times the world average. Mauritius exports all the locally produced sugar and imports cheap sugar from the COMESA market to sell it to its citizens cheaply, he said. 

A World Bank report on Kenya released last week says the protection measures have contributed to making Kenya a high-cost sugar producer, hurting the consumer.The high cost of producing sugar in Kenya is attributed to high cost of farm inputs. Kenya’s average production cost stands at $950 per metric tonne compared to regional countries like Malawi where the cost is as low as $350 per metric tonne.  When the safeguards were granted Kenya was asked to, among other conditions, come up with a formula for paying farmers and sell the State-owned millers. Some of the State millers are Miwani, Muhoroni, Awendo-based Sony, Nzoia, and Chemelil. Currently, the payment is based on a farmer’s supplies and the industry average. According to the COMESA safeguards, the payment would be quality-based judged by sucrose content, not the bulk. The KSB, the industry watchdog, says a pilot is running in Sony and Nzoia. The impending sale of the millers has been delayed for years, the Cabinet having given it a nod in 2010. But it could not take off, partly because there was no law and having the Privatization Commission in place also took a while.

Critics and reviewers, however, have voted overwhelmingly for the sale of the former giants to inject efficiency backed by new investment, talent, and limited political interference.  Before the window closed in the first four years of the first extension, all these millers had a combined debt of Sh50 billion, one of the factors that delayed their sale.  The minister has blamed the delay in privatization on the last Parliament, that, he says, did not give the government the go-ahead. “Parliament did not give the Treasury the privatization go-ahead that would have started early this year,” said Mr Koskei. 

The government negotiated for the COMESA lifeline to allow the importation of 200,000 tonnes to meet the country’s deficit, whose total annual consumption stands at 700,000 tonnes against the local production of 500,000 tonnes.This comes even as the regulator has warned that it will cancel the licences of the sugar factories that would not comply with the sugar policy that requires all the millers to have more than one income generating project. The policy, to be implemented in the next 24 months by the KSB is aimed at protecting the local sugar industry from collapsing in the weight of cheap sugar once the COMESA window closes. KSB chief executive officer Rosemary M’kok says that the 24-month window period is enough time for all the sugar factories to have complied with the requirement. “The factories that would not have complied with our policy will definitely have their licences cancelled as KSB will not renew them,” Ms M’kok said. It would be mandatory for all the millers to produce sugar, ethanol and electricity as a different source of generating income, instead of relying on sugar alone.

Thursday, April 5, 2012

EAC/EABC Monitoring of NTBs

The EAC in collaboration with EABC has developed the Non Tariff Barriers (NTBs) mechanism as envisaged in Article 13 of the EAC Customs Union Protocol. The mechanism provided for the establishment of the National Monitoring Committees in the Partner States and the Regional Forum on NTBs to assist in identifying, monitoring and the elimination of NTBs.  The mechanism is also replicated at a Tripartite level in the COMESA-EAC SADC NTB Monitoring Database. 

Currently the EAC has undertaken a study on the development of a legally binding enforcement mechanism based on international best practice for elimination of NTBs in the region.  The study is expected to analyse the effectiveness of the EAC mechanism on identifying, monitoring and elimination of NTBs as per the EAC Time Bound Programme.  The study is also expected to categorize NTBs into categories to be subjected to legally binding enforcement mechanisms based on proposed criteria and propose NTBs to be arbitrated by the East African Court of Justice.  Hence a key outcome of the study will be proposals to strengthen the EAC Mechanism through introduction of legal enforcement clauses in the current system.

In addition, EAC is coordinating preparation of an EAC position on the elimination Non-Tariff Barriers under the on-going negotiations for the Tripartite Free Trade Area to ensure that the issue of elimination NTBs in the FTA is well articulated.  In this respect the monitoring of services barriers should be included, which will expand on the approach which currently lends itself mainly to trade facilitation issues.

Thursday, March 8, 2012

Bileateral Investment Treaties (BITs) Coming Back To Bite

Published by TIA

See related blog post on ICSID

African governments once rushed into signing Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) to encourage FDI. Lawyers are however now calling for new models.

With much of Africa’s investment coming from abroad, how governments manage complaints from foreign companies is a vital determinant of the business environment. For decades, foreign investors depended on diplomatic protection from home governments in their overseas adventures, which occasionally gave rise to “gunboat diplomacy”. The US, for example, sent troops into Latin America 34 times to settle commercial disputes.

Since the 1960s, and spiking in the 1990s, a more formal investment approach was attempted in the form of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). These state-to-state agreements establish how governments handle investors from each other’s country, covering fair and equitable treatment, security, and compensation for expropriation, in assets but also, in some cases, in shares, stocks, bonds and other modalities. While BITs infringe sovereignty, in that disputes are settled in international tribunals and not domestic courts, many developing countries saw them as a way of signalling their attractiveness for foreign investment.

The number of treaties has grown exponentially, to around 2,500 today. The number of claims is growing too. Philip Morris, Total, Mobil, Shell, Siemens and Cargill have all taken states to arbitration, with Sri Lanka suffering the first award against a developing country in 1990. Twenty-six percent of new claims in 2010 had an African or Middle Eastern state party involved. In Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Namibia, Liberia, Algeria and Senegal have all faced actions. There are likely to be more disputes in areas such as mining, water and agriculture, according to Mahnaz Malik, an investment arbitration lawyer at the Chambers of Arthur Marriott QC at 12 Gray’s Inn Square. She warns that events such as the Arab Spring can generate a flood of claims.

But so far, South Africa is arguably the most prominent in the African context. Pretoria signed 30 BITs post-1994 to attract private investment. The new government had inherited a society that was among the most unequal in the world, where the vast majority of black South Africans had been excluded from meaningful economic activity under apartheid. As part of a set of initiatives to redress this inheritance and to meet the government’s constitutional obligation to create a more open and equitable society based on human rights, Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) programmes were initiated.

In 2007, a group of investors from Italy and Luxembourg filed a claim at the Convention of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), arguing that South Africa’s 2002 Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) contained provisions that amounted to expropriation of their mineral rights, thus violating the BITs South Africa had signed with both countries. The MPRDA, a separate piece of legislation from BEE that aims to transform the minerals industry in South Africa, requires that holders of mineral rights undertake equity or equity-equivalent obligations; requirements emerging from consultations between the government and relevant parties, including representatives of the claimants. The South African government defended the MPRDA by arguing that it protected existing mineral rights and allowed for their uninterrupted use so long as companies also met the government’s wider transformational obligations in some accepted combination. In a punitive judgment, the Icsid tribunal dismissed the claimant’s case, ordered them to pay the legal costs of the South African government, and prevented claimants from bringing any such action again in future.

On the basis of similar reviews conducted internationally, notably, in the US, Norway, and certain Latin American states, South Africa launched a lengthy BIT review, the conclusion of which is that the country will not enter any new treaties unless there are “compelling economic reasons”, says Xavier Carim, deputy director general of the international trade and economic development division of South Africa’s Department of Trade and Industry. “The very fact that narrow, shortsighted commercial interests can subject progressive and laudable government policies to international arbitration, the outcomes of which are unpredictable, creates unacceptable risks that can have a chilling impact on legitimate public policy making,” he says, noting that there have been inconsistencies in the rulings taken by tribunals over similar cases.

It would be simplistic to characterise BITs as simply giving rise to clashes between progressive government policy and corporate interests. In some cases, such as a SOABI v. Senegal dispute, the problem was a largely technical disagreement over terms and conditions of a low cost housing programme.

In Zimbabwe, cases have been brought in objection to the ruling Zanu-PF party’s arbitrary and at times violent land reform programme. Broad and ambiguous terms have been a central problem of many agreements, says Jansen Calamita, senior research fellow in international trade and investment law at the British Institute of Comparative and International Law. “BITs are an agreement by the host state to accept the application of external standards to determine the legality of its actions – standards above and beyond the state’s constitution and national law. If the standards agreed are not clear – as they largely are not – it will be left to tribunals to give meaning and effect to those standards.”

Some lawyers believe the first wave of BITs were signed too fast, with text penned by a closely-knit group of Western lawyers. The majority of BITs reflect the texts developed to promote the 1960s anti-communist, post-decolonisation protection agenda for European investors, says Ms Malik. She believes capacity to understand complex investment law issues is not always present in developing country negotiators. She notes that the imbalance becomes more acute as negotiations are often based on the developed country’s model. In a speech at the London School of Economics, Randall Williams of the South African Trade Department claimed to have seen negotiators making agreements without the presence of a lawyer.

Latin American governments have come out strongly in opposition to prevailing norms. In 2009, Ecuador’s vice minister of foreign affairs, Lautaro Pozo, said BITs reflected a “fifty year old ideology” and that many countries signed them without sufficient understanding of their implications. BITs did not, in his reckoning, reflect the objectives of developing states, especially on issues of the environment and human rights.

In one case, Philip Morris tried to sue Uruguay for copyright infringement when it ruled that cigarette packets needed to carry health warnings. Bolivian President Evo Morales claims that international arbitration offends state sovereignty, with Bolivia, Ecuador and most recently Venezuela denouncing Icsid, the Washington-based arbitration body, part of the World Bank Group, which settles nearly half of claims. India and Mexico have both refused to be party to the Icsid Convention, and Brazil has not ratified any BITs.

Others are more upbeat. “I think the backlash against investment treaties is overstated,” says Anthony Sinclair, a partner at law firm Allen & Overy. “Countries continue to sign these treaties at a rate of about 50 a year.” Mr Sinclair acknowledges there is “fine-tuning and recalibrating” of text, especially in terms of public interest regulation. “At the same time, countries are in search of growth, for which foreign investment is key.”

There is no credible analysis proving the effect of BITs on investment, which would be very hard to quantify. Furthermore, BITs are not the sole determinant of investment. China is a prolific signatory, but continues to invest in countries without BITs – in contrast to Germany, where risk insurance is only issued to companies if they are operating in a country with a German treaty. Yet whenever governments and investors are discussing major cross-border investment, “everybody” on both sides is talking about investment treaties, Mr Sinclair claims.

The focus on treaties should not draw attention away from domestic reforms which could lessen the investment risk. Guinea-Bissau has undertaken domestic reform, turning a single court system dealing with everything from divorces to commercial disputes, into a more differentiated structure with commercial courts run by appropriately trained legal teams and judges, says Raimundo Pereira, speaker of the Parliament of Guinea-Bissau. Nonetheless, bilateral frameworks do appear to be of growing importance to investors.

Despite the frustrations, there is little that can be done about existing treaties until they expire, at which point clearer text can be negotiated, or countries can withdraw. Pulling out of active treaties altogether is unlikely. Even South Africa has not done so, given the diplomatic downsides. The goal of African legal teams is to improve the text in future agreements.

To date, many African governments employed international law firms to advise on treaties. While this helps buffet their expertise in negotiations, capacity-building of African government lawyers is needed. Rukia Baruti recently founded the African International Legal Awareness (AILA) programme, which in late 2011 organised a week long BIT training workshop. Participants included lawyers from Liberia, Ghana, Uganda, the Gambia, Egypt and South Africa. Baruti organised the workshop, held in London, after attending an investment conference in Mauritius, where many African attendees were unfamiliar with investment treaty arbitration.

“By building capacity and increasing awareness of the consequences of concluding investment treaties, African states will, before signing such treaties, carefully examine the meaning and consider the provisions. This would go a long way to avoiding disputes involving African states.”  Mr Sinclair speaks approvingly of AILA, in which his firm participated. “There is no shortage of good will on the part of international lawyers to contribute on a pro bono basis. The issue is whether there are enough people with sufficient inspiration and energy, like Rukia, to organise these activities. Otherwise busy lawyers in firms or chambers, or in academic careers, may not be able to produce something like this themselves.”

Aila has since been approached by African governments to deliver training in-country. Similarly, the International Institute for Sustainable Development has conducted training courses for African government officials in country and at a regional level.  It is important to note that while bilateral treaties have been overwhelmingly North-South in the past, that is changing in reflection of growing South-South economic interaction. Current BITs between developing countries include Mozambique-Indonesia, Djibouti-China and Eritrea-Uganda. South-South deals provide a platform to create more development-orientated texts, but often the European template is copied over. Regional treaties on the other hand tend to create more bespoke texts.

“I have found that debate is healthier in regional dynamics compared to a bilateral context,” says Ms Malik. A recent COMESA Agreement treaty contains more nuanced obligations than those found typically in bilateral treaties, she claims, including provisions to allow tribunals to take greater account of the development status of the host state. The COMESA treaty also omitted the full protection and security standard, a controversial feature in many BITs which puts hefty responsibilities on states. Algeria was taken to tribunal to pay damages related to civil unrest during the civil war. Similarly, Congo faced a claim for riots on the streets of Kinshasa.

The COMESA treaty, and new model texts, exhibit the potential for designing modern templates, says Ms Malik. “It shows African countries that they are not tied to the old European model. It paves the way for innovation in terms of making the treaties better balanced.”

Published by TIA : 05 March, 2012

Friday, September 9, 2011

Tripartite FTA COMESA-EAC-SADC

The Second Tripartite Summit of Heads of State and Government (COMESA-EAC-SADC) took place on 12 June, 2011, in Johannesburg, South Africa. A major achievement of the summit includes the official launch of negotiations on the Tripartite Free Trade Area (FTA). Agreement was reached on the negotiating principles, processes, scope and institutional framework. A roadmap and timelines for establishing the FTA were also agreed.
Negotiations will be open to all the 26 countries of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite. It was agreed that the first phase of negotiations will address tariff liberalisation, rules of origin, customs cooperation and customs related matters, non-tariff barriers, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to tade and dispute settlement. The second phase will focus on negotiation trade in services and trade related issues, including intellectual property rights competition policy and trade development and competitiveness, . Facilitating movement of business persons within the region will be negotiated in parallel with the first phase as a separate track..
A timeline of 36 months has been set for completion of negotiations for the first phase and the movement of business person which will run concurrently. No timeframe has, however, been indicted for the second and final phase of FTA negotiations. .
Once in place, the Tripartite FTA will establish a larger market for Eastern and Southern Africa - leading to improved trade performance and competitiveness for the region.
Resource materials can be accessed here.

The negotiations were concluded, see related materials here.

Wednesday, February 24, 2010

Tripartite FTA and East and Southern African States Participating in EPAs

The Tripartite FTA (see text of the agreement) between COMESA, EAC and SADC which was finally signed and s expected to facilitate the largest Free Trade Area in Africa by creating a more liberal regime between the Members of the three RECs COMESA< SADC and EAC. However some Members of the three RECs have various other trade agreements (e.g. Mauritius-Pakistan) and notably the Economic Partnership Agreements with the EC (ie EAC-EPA, SADC-EPA, ESA- EPA, TDCA and EC-Egypt FTA). The Grand FTA will require the free circulation of goods among the three RECs however its not clear how this will be feasible in the short to medium term in light of the 11 different schedules of liberalisation with the EC.

It is not practical to erect a barrier between cross border States that join and those that do not join an EPA. In practical terms therefore, little is achieved by staying outside of an interim EPA (which applies only to goods) when one is in FTA with neighbouring States that have signed, however one could assert that the cost of implementation and reciprocity is not borne since the principal reason to remain outside a goods EPA is to avoid reciprocity. However this goal would be undermined by cross-border trade if the outsider also participated in an effective FTA or customs union with countries that were also EPA members. Therefore the question arises whether countries that are currently not in trading regime with the EC, namely Angola, DRC, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan and Malawi, would join a grand FTA with countries that are in an EPA. The problems of incompatible trade policy arise for countries that are not liberalizing on any product and those that are- hence a potential barrier to regionalism has been created between signatories of EPAs and other agreements that are different from those of their regional partners.

In any case the Tripartite agreement is now signed and the MFN clause applies. Article 7 says:

Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent a Tripartite Member/Partner State from maintaining or entering into new preferential trade agreements with third countries provided that any advantage, concession, privilege or favour granted to a third country under such agreements are offered to the other Tripartite Member/Partner States on a reciprocal basis.