Case for a Multilateral Investment Agreement?

Despite the importance of FDI, its governance is fragmented and is found in multilateral agreements, RTAs and in BITs. There is however no single, comprehensive multilateral treaty or institution to oversee investment activity. Previous attempts to bring FDI under multilateral purview have failed. The result is a complex and confusing overlay of disciplines at different levels. To address this issue, a recent study on Investment under the auspices of the World Economic Forum makes a case for multilateral rules on investment and six reasons are stressed. 

First, the rise of Global Value Chains (GVCs) sharpens the need for global and holistic regulations; GVCs need global rules. Second, there is a proven appetite for international investment regulation; nations are “voting with their pens” for more discipline – signing hundreds of BITs and RTAs. But the result lacks coherence in terms of rules and application. Third, the North-South divide is disappearing on the investment-governance issue. Emerging markets’ role in FDI has grown tremendously in recent years –both as home and host nations. Fourth, the stigma that has been historically attached to FDI has sharply abated in recent years. Many countries are pursuing economic liberalization for the recognized benefits it brings. Fifth, and by contrast, the fragile and slow recovery of the world economy has led some countries to adopt protectionist measures against trade and investment. This regression heightens the need for multilateral rules. Sixth, increased FDI by State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) presents new challenges to ensuring that competition conditions in the global marketplace remain equitable and do not give rise to national security concerns.

The report further argues that if an International Investment Agreement (IIA) is to emerge in the future, the WTO is the logical home for it. The WTO has the potential to yield more equitable outcomes and ensure non-discrimination, and it provides access to a dispute settlement mechanism that has worked well. This IIA may entail provisions in different areas, including the protection of investors, establishing investor-state dispute settlement and subjecting the agreement to the WTO state-state system, and providing post establishment national treatment. Pre-establishment or access provisions on investment are also important, as are notions of corporate social responsibility. In any case, there is a sense that the balance of rights and obligations needs to be revisited.

However another Study by Econstor states that the case for a WTO agreement on investment is weak. Four main reasons are given. 

• The absence of such an agreement has not prevented the recent boom of FDI in developing countries through RTAs, BITs and unilaterally.
• Likewise, substantial unilateral liberalization of FDI regulations was undertaken in the past even though multilateral obligations to do so did not exist. 
• The coverage of protections provided for investors in various BITs (and RTAs) goes beyond what can be expected from the Doha Round. Nevertheless, BITs do not appear to have had a significant impact on FDI flows to signatory countries. 
• It is also questionable whether RTAs such as NAFTA as well as MERCOSUR had a strong and lasting effect on FDI flows to developing member countries. 

Can Africa Feed Africa?

A new World Bank report Africa Can Help Feed Africa: Removing barriers to regional trade in food staples ―says that Africa’s farmers can potentially grow enough food to feed the continent and avert future food crises if countries remove cross-border restrictions on the food trade within the region. According to the Bank, the continent would also generate an extra US$20 billion in yearly earnings if African leaders can agree to dismantle trade barriers that blunt more regional dynamism. The report was released on the eve of an African Union (AU) ministerial summit in Addis Ababa on agriculture and trade.

According to the report “Africa has the ability to grow and deliver good quality food to put on the dinner tables of the continent’s families, however, this potential is not being realized because farmers face more trade barriers in getting their food to market than anywhere else in the world. Too often borders get in the way of getting food to homes and communities which are struggling with too little to eat.”

With many African farmers effectively cut off from the high-yield seeds, and the affordable fertilizers and pesticides needed to expand their crop production, including unpredictable weather patterns, the continent has turned to foreign imports to meet its growing needs in staple foods.

See full report here for some policy considerations.

Linking Trade Policy to Supply Chain Constraints

Since the birth of the GATT in 1947, multilateral negotiations have focused primarily on reducing barriers to trade for specific products and sectors: tariffs, subsidies, and different types of nontariff barriers. A recent report by the World Economic Forum, in collaboration with Bain & Company and the World Bank (WEF 2013), Enabling Trade: Valuing Growth Opportunities (World Economic Forum, Bain & Co. and World Bank 2013) concludes that improving border management and transport and communications infrastructure services could increase global GDP by up to six times more than removing all import tariffs.

Reducing supply-chain barriers to attain 50% of the global best practice level – as observed in Singapore – could increase global GDP by some 4.7% and global trade by 14.5%. By contrast, the global GDP and trade gains available from complete worldwide tariff elimination amount to some 0.7% and 10.1%, respectively. The gains from reducing supply-chain barriers would also be more evenly distributed across countries than those associated with tariff elimination. A less ambitious set of reforms that moves countries halfway to regional best practice (e.g. Chile in Latin America) could increase global GDP by 2.6% and world trade by 9.4%.

A pilot project implemented by eBay shows that helping small and medium-sized enterprises navigate the regulatory regimes of importing countries could expand their volume of international sales by 60 to 80%. Given that small and medium-sized enterprises account for a large share of total economic activity, this type of targeted trade facilitation could have significant positive spillover effects on employment.

Such large increases in GDP would be associated with positive effects on unemployment, potentially adding millions of jobs to the global workforce.

What could be done to realise the large potential welfare gains from an approach to policy focussed on supply chain barriers? The World Economic Forum report makes five specific recommendations:

1. Create a national mechanism to set policy priorities for improving supply-chain efficiency based on objective performance data and feedback loops between government and firms;

Governments must work with businesses and analysts to determine the policies and procedures that will help reach key tipping points. A central component of this effort should be the creation of mechanisms to collect data on factors affecting supply-chain operations. These data can then be used to identify ‘clusters’ of policies that jointly determine key supply chain barriers, identify priorities for action, and assess progress.

2. Create a focal point within government with a mandate to coordinate and oversee all regulation that directly affects supply chain efficiency;

Given the importance of tipping points, governments need to design policy with an economy-wide vision and recognition that industry-specific supply chains are affected by different clusters of policies. Improving supply-chain performance requires coherence and coordination across many government agencies and collaboration with industry.

3. Ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises’ interests are represented in the policy prioritisation process and that solutions are designed to address specific constraints that impact disproportionately on these businesses;

Because small and medium-sized enterprises’ ability to overcome supply-chain barriers is proportionally more difficult, governments should pay special attention to the needs of smaller businesses. For example, one relatively straightforward policy identified in the report is to raise levels for customs-duty collection that are too trivial to merit serious consideration in order to facilitate small-business engagement in international markets; another is to ensure that initiatives to reduce regulatory compliance costs such as ‘trusted trader’ programmes are complemented by programs that are accessible to small and medium-sized enterprises.

4. Pursue a ‘whole of the supply chain’ approach in international trade negotiations;

Greater coherence of domestic policies is important, but a key insight derived from the case studies is that coordination across countries matters as well. Joint action will increase the overall gains from lower supply-chain barriers. International trade negotiations usually take a silo approach, addressing policy areas in isolation. Lowering supply-chain barriers requires a more comprehensive and integrated approach that spans key sectors that impact on trade logistics, including services such as transport and distribution, as well as policy areas that jointly determine supply-chain performance – in particular those related to border protection and management, product health and safety, foreign investment, and the movement of business people and service providers.

Such a ‘whole of the supply chain’ approach can be pursued both at the multilateral (i.e. WTO) level and in regional trade agreements. Doing so would greatly enhance the relevance of international trade cooperation for businesses and help generate the engagement that is needed for trade agreements to obtain the political support needed to be adopted by national legislatures and to be implemented by governments. As has been argued by many observers, one lesson of the failure to conclude the Doha Round is that what is on the table is not seen to make enough of a difference from an operational business perspective. A supply-chain approach has great potential to address this failure and in the process provide a low-cost economic stimulus for the world economy in the medium term.

5. Launch a global effort to pursue conversion of manual and paper-based documentation to electronic systems, using globally agreed data formats.

Many of the inefficiencies in the operation of supply chains reflect a lack of reliability due to delays and uncertainty stemming from manual paper-based documentation, redundancy in data requirements and the absence of pre-arrival clearance and risk management-based implementation of policy. A global effort to adopt common documentary and electronic data/information standards would reduce administrative costs, errors, and time associated with moving goods across borders.

To address some these challenges, it is hoped that the WTO negotiations on trade facilitation will be succesfully concluded in Bali at the end of this year, 2013.

EAC Industrialization Policy 2012-2032

The EAC Industrialization Policy and Strategy provides general contours of policy intentions and strategic areas of focus to guide EAC towards achieving the set goals and in particular, attaining industrialized economic status by 2032. The EAC Industrialization Policy is intended to address the challenges facing the region particularly, the need to build a more diversified regional economic structure. 

The formulation of the policy was accomplished through a comprehensive and inclusive process, based on analysis and wide consultations with stakeholders in the Partner States. The policy is aligned to the relevant Articles of the Treaty in particular Article 79 and 80 which provide for regional co-operation in matters of industrial development as well as Article 44 of Common Market Protocol in which the Partner States undertake to adopt common principles to cooperate in Industrial Development in the region. 

The Partner States have set themselves ambitious targets to be met within the timeframe, of the policy as follows: 

a) Diversifying the manufacturing base and raising local value added content (LVAC) of resource based exports to 40% from the currently estimated value of 8.62 % by 2032; 

b) Strengthening national and regional institutional frameworks and capabilities for industrial policy design and implementation; and delivery of support services to ensure sustainable industrialization in the region; 

c) Strengthening R&D, Technology and Innovation capabilities to facilitate structural transformation of the manufacturing sector and upgrading of production systems; 

d) Increasing the contribution of (i) intra regional manufacturing exports relative to total manufactured imports in to the region from the current 5% to about 25% by 2032 

e) increasing the share of manufactured exports as a percentage of total merchandise exports to 60% from an average of 20%; and

f) Transforming Micro Small and Medium Enterprises into viable and sustainable business entities capable of contributing up to 50% of manufacturing GDP from 20% base rate.

To address the industrialisation challenges, the following broad policy measures will be undertaken:

1. Promoting the Development of Strategic Regional Industries/Value Chains; and enhance Value Addition

2. Strengthening national and regional institutional capabilities for industrial policy design and management

3. Strengthening the capacity of industry support institutions (ISIs) to develop and sustain a competitive regional industrial sector

4. Strengthening the Business and Regulatory Environment

5. Enhancing access to financial and technical resources for Industrialization

6. Facilitating the development of, and access to appropriate industrial skills and know-how

7. Facilitating the Development of Micro, small and medium enterprises (MISMEs)

8. Strengthening Industrial Information Management and Dissemination Systems

9. Promoting equitable industrial development in the EAC region

10. Developing supporting infrastructure for industrialisation along selected economic corridors

11. Promoting regional collaboration and development of capability in industrial R&D, technology and innovation

12. Promoting sustainable Industrialisation and environment management

13. Expansion of trade and market access for manufactured products

14. Promoting Gender in industrial development.

To exploit the resource endowment in the region and enhance the region’s industrialisation levels, the EAC Industrialisation Policy has earmarked six strategic resource-based industries, in which the region has a comparative advantage and which will be developed to facilitate productive integration (PI) through industrial deepening, diversifying, specialisation and upgrading. The strategic regional industries to be promoted include:

1. Agro processing

2. Iron steel processing and other mineral processing

3. Chemicals (fertilizers and agro chemicals)

4. Pharmaceuticals

5. Energy

6. Oil and gas processing

See the Policy and related documents here.

South Africa's Skills Shortage Dilemma

There is no doubt that the conundrum of an acute skills shortage alongside mass unemployment constitutes the most critical issue threatening the future of South Africa. This year the country has recorded a growth rate of 2.7% and the unemployment rate is about 33%, including those who have given up looking for work. Seventy percent of those unemployed are said to be under the age of 35. A woman leaving school in Limpopo stands a one in eight chance of ever getting a job. 

The skills shortage and high unemployment interact with each other in a devastating way. It is insightful to note that SA’s key problem is how it is going to maintain the growth rate it needs to feed its growing population. SA won’t be able to use the method employed by the Southeast Asian ‘tigers’ of using cheap labour to undercut its export competitors while it grows its economy and expands its skills base, because its labour unions will prevent that.

One solution is to develop a skills-training model based on systems that have been used for years in Germany, Switzerland and several Scandinavian countries. This would involve not only vastly improving the education system but also integrating it with a system of apprenticeships. 

The essence of the German education system is that it is channelled into different streams. There are three streams, actually, but for our purposes we need focus only on two — an academic and a vocational stream. Students should be given a choice, after passing, say, grade 9 or 10, whether they want to continue in the academic stream and go on to university, or learn a vocational skill through an apprenticeship programme. 

Those who drop out of high school earlier should also have the opportunity of entering an apprenticeship course. 

These apprenticeships should be wide-ranging, from becoming a skilled baker or hairdresser, to a motor mechanic, a construction worker or an electrician. A student deciding to enter an apprenticeship must find an employer who will take him or her on to train for the career the individual has chosen — which is usually three years. 

During that time, the student will spend part of his time gaining practical on-the-job experience working for the employer, and part of it attending classes at a vocational school. The classes will focus mainly on the technical side of the job; the shop-floor work on the practical side. Running records have to be kept by both the employer and the vocational school instructors so that the training can be co-ordinated. 

The apprentices are paid a small salary throughout the apprenticeship period, which usually goes up a little each year as their skills advance. At the end, they have to write an exam run by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. When they pass that they are qualified as a skilled professional in the chosen work category — and receive a certificate testifying to that. 

School-leavers in SA today have no craft certification of any sort, which makes getting that critical first-time job in the face of sceptical employers faced with labour regulation requirements cruelly difficult. 

However salary is the thing that troubles the trade unions. 

But the suggestion of how to get around this political problem is to enact a law establishing that the apprenticeship period falls under the Department of Education, not the Department of Labour. 

The Congress of South African Trade Unions actually recognises the need for on-the-job training at lower pay, but it has become so entrenched in its commitment to the principle of "decent work" that it can’t lose face by backing off from it. 

Classifying an apprenticeship as part of an individual’s education may be a way around that difficulty, because the labour regulations could remain unchanged and become applicable to the apprentice only after he has graduated from his apprenticeship. 

A further advantage of the German system is that, after successfully completing a full apprenticeship course, a student can continue at the vocational school for another year or two to acquire higher certification as a "master" baker, mechanic or whatever, which rates as the equivalent of matric — thus opening the way to go to university and, beyond that, to a graduate school of business for an MBA. 

SA's graduates would then be able to seek a job in management with the special advantage of knowing what life is like for workers on the shop floor and earning their respect in turn for having that knowledge. 

Flexibility is the essence of any such system, so that German students from the academic stream can also switch to become apprentices after passing matric if they so wish, enabling them to follow the same route to a job in management. 

SA is going to need skilled workers every bit as much as she needs to reduce the unemployment rate. 

Original Article by Allister Sparks: Business Day

New Database On Global Value Supply Chains

The European Union has launched the new "World Input-Output Database" which allows trade analysts to assess the global value chains created by world trade. These added-value chains have become an essential feature of economic reality as trade is becoming increasingly globalised as today's traded products are not produced in a single location but rather are the end result of a series of steps carried out in many countries around the world. Instead of counting the gross value of goods and services exchanged, the new database reveals the value added embodied in these goods and services as they are traded internationally. The findings are significant as they change the perception of the competitiveness of certain sectors in some countries. 

In addition, policy makers and societies at large are facing increasingly pressing trade-offs between socio-economic and environmental developments. Increases in production induce growth in the use of non-renewable resources such as fossil fuels, materials, land and water. Furthermore, they generate higher levels of waste and emissions of environmental pollutants. Simultaneously, increasing global integration through international trade and technological developments creates a tension. In this regard, the database considers satellite accounts with environmental and socio-economic indicators, from which industry-level data can provide the necessary input to several types of models used to evaluate policies aimed at striking a suitable balance between growth, environmental degradation and inequality across the world.

Karel De Gucht, the EU commissioner for trade has said that the change in statistical accounting for trade applied in the database has been developed to determine the consequences of the fragmentation of supply chains. For example a third of world trade happens within firms while two thirds of European imports are not of final products but of intermediate goods and raw materials, to which EU firms add one or more layers of value before they are finally sold, often for export.  The EU trade commissioner gave the example of a Nokia smartphone, "it is listed as being made in China, but in reality 54% of its value comes from tasks that are carried out in Europe. Key components are produced in other parts of Asia and only the assembly itself actually happens in China.  Today, we measure trade by counting the total price of the good that is being exported or imported, but because we do this both for components and for final products we get a distorted picture of what is really happening.  Hence according to the database, when we look at trade in value as opposed to traditional statistics, EU trade deficit with China is reduced by 36%. In 2011, the trade deficit between the EU and China stood at EUR155.9 billion however using this new method China-EU deficit starts to look like less of a problem."

On services, interestingly when looking at trade in supply chain terms,  the classic distinction in trade policy between goods and services is increasingly artificial. This is because services represents almost 60% of the value European firms add to the products exported from Europe. 

The database covers 27 EU countries and 13 other major countries in the world for the period from 1995 to 2009. It is notable that not a single African country is included in the database which possibly says something about Africa's non-participation or rather minuscule contribution to global supply chains. In addition, all BRICS economies are included in the database with the notable exception of South Africa.  One wonders why the EU wants African countries to eliminate export taxes (under the EPAs) when in essence the contribution of African exports to global trade and supply chains is too insignificant to be in included in the database.

African countries generally export largely raw materials (e.g fuels, metals) and some agricultural products to the EU and generally lack capacity to add value domestically especially for manufactured products. Other supply capacity barriers to Africa's participation in global value chains include limited foreign ownership and lack of global networks which are a significant factor in characterizing the intensity of global exports but not necessarily for regional exports. The lack of technological advancement is also a significant barrier especially in global exports. Public infrastructure constraints, such as inferior power services and customs delays, seem to have more immediate impacts on regional exports as does customs efficiency and poor trade facilitation which is also hampers the competitive participation of African producers in global supply chain industries. 

In a related article, we saw that China overcame similar challenges by exploiting joint ventures.  China allowed foreign firms access to the domestic market in exchange for technology transfer through joint production or joint ventures. In fact, 100% foreign owned firms were a rarity among the leading players in the industry in China, unlike Export Processing Zones in Africa. China’s openness to foreign investment and its willingness to create Special Economic Zones (SEZs) where foreign producers could operate with good infrastructure and with minimum hassles must therefore receive considerable credit. However if China  welcomed foreign companies, she always did so with the objective of fostering domestic capabilities.

Why Export Bans Fail to Spur Local Value Addition

Exports of raw cashews nuts by Kenyan farmers were banned last year in a bid to revive the local cashew nut industry. The ban provided that only Government and the National Cereals and Produce Board would be authorized to buy raw nuts from farmers. The purpose of the ban was to attract investors to set up cashew nut processing units in the country, however, the low volumes of nuts produced meant that a year later, no factory of viable capacity has been established.

There could have been some implementation weaknesses. The national task force that recommended the ban, also proposed that the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCBP) should become the buyer of last resort and market regulator, as is the case with maize and wheat. However since  no funds were channeled to NCPB for the task, this gave middlemen a field day as they bought the nuts at about a third of the price prevailing before the ban. As a result, farmers are now bracing themselves for substantial losses following cashew nut harvests and government delays in providing alternative marketing channels. 

If I may think out loud- I wonder if the authorities made specific efforts to increase production of local cashew nuts, identify investors, provide incentives and jointly venture with them, to help establish cashew processing plants in the country. 

See recent article here.

Africa's Energy Infrastructure

Africa's 5 power pools are well illustrated in the 2010 Energy Atlas. The Energy Atlas also shows the current energy projects in the continent including the % of population with access to power. Despite various efforts to generate increased renewable and non renewable energy, Africa is the only continent estimated to generate less power than demand necessitates, in the next few decades.  

                                               Click to enlarge

Source: Africa Energy

EPA Rules of Origin and Value Added Methodology

My article on Tralac website republished here. (original dated March 2007)

In a March 2005 communication, the European Commission (EC) proposed a radical change to its origin rules and suggested that the reform would simplify processes and make the rules more development friendly. The EC envisages sweeping away the present multiplicity of rules of origin and replacing them with a single rule, based on value addition in the beneficiary country. Under this methodology, a product resulting from the working or processing of imported non-originating materials would be considered as originating if the value added in the country (or in a region where cumulation is permitted) amounted at least to a certain threshold (a minimum "local of regional value content") expressed as a percentage of the net production cost of the final product. 

Value addition is one of the three major criteria to determine last substantial transformation for non-originating inputs in the ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement. The other two criteria are the Change in Tariff Heading (CTH) test which requires that the tariff-heading of the final product should be different from the tariff-headings of its inputs at the four HS digit code and the Specific Process (SP) test, which requires a product to undergo certain stipulated processes before originating status can be conferred. 

As agreed by ACP Ministers in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea in June 2006, the negotiating mechanism for the rules of origin in the EPA negotiations will be at the level of the ACP-EU. In this regard, while the harmonisation of the methodology for determining substantial transformation in the EU rules of origin regime is understandable, given that the EU has about forty preferential arrangements with third countries or groups of third countries in total, a proposed move to a single value addition methodology in the ACP-EU EPA negotiations would undermine the ACP negotiating position given its less frequent usage as a sole criteria and comparatively infant stages of regional integration in the ACP.

With regard to the usage of the value added methodology, the recent study by ODI Creating Development Friendly Rules of Origin in the EU found that the value added test has been aplied as the originating test for only about one tenth of the products that poor countries such as ACP countries actually export to the EU. Furthermore the study indicates that the value added test is the second most frequently applied sole substantial transformation criterion after specific processes, with a utilisation of 23.5% across all EU agreements. Taking this into account, a move to this single approach within the ACP could erode the benefits accruing in the EPA negotiations, unless the methodology can accommodate the CTH rules and SP and production methods already triggering trade within the Cotonou Agreement.

Given that the future ACP-EU rules of origin are expected to be an outcome of the EPA negotiations, a single value added approach by the EC would still need to accommodate ACP interests as part of the outcome of the negotiations. The ACP-EU negotiations would therefore need to take into account sound regional economic analysis that meets the objectives of the EPAs, which is development. Any benchmarks under consideration would need to enhance and stimulate trade for this methodology to be feasible across the sectors of interest to the ACP.

In addition, the ACP countries may also consider the following in their negotiations:

The value addition criteria, where it is utilized would rather be costs based rather than the ex-works price. The ex works price currently applied in the Cotonou Agreement may compromise the value of the EPA preferences particularly for landlocked and LDC countries.

Methodology for the valuation of non-originating materials will need to consider that some ACP States to date, still do not have the capacity to implement and apply the WTO or WCO customs valuation agreements.

The methodology should provide reduced local value added thresholds for LDCs and small, vulnerable, island and landlocked States given their unique challenges.

Value added thresholds where they are agreed upon should be as low as necessary to accommodate the diverse objectives of the different EPA regions and sectors of interest given that high or low wages and rents can conceal the true value added levels.

Thresholds will need to be achievable by firms and enterprises across the board and be based on EPA regional economic analysis and specific sectors of interest given that percentages for minimum value addition thresholds can vary significantly between products and sectors. This may arise due to the prevailing labour costs, capital and technology, cost of inputs and the import dependence of the region in terms of intermediates.

Reciprocity in rules of origin will need to be considered given that thresholds will need to accommodate the variance between developed, developing and least developed countries. This may need to be sector specific, such as clothing, textiles and fisheries, given that the ODI study on rules of origin has indicated that value added is not always lowest in low-income countries with some EU countries meeting lower value added thresholds than ACP States in certain sectors in light of technological advances for instance.

ACP defensive rules of origin will need to complement the objectives of ACP sensitive sectors vis a vis the EU and hence the value added methodology may need to consider EU sectoral processes and production advantages as well.

Detailed regional analysis will need to supplement the ACP-EU level negotiations both on the substance and objectives of EPAs. The negotiations should therefore take into account the highly unequal levels of the Parties with regard to regional integration. The concerns around overlapping membership in regional trade agreements and thereby overlapping rules of origin are relevant, if EPAs are to promote regional integration and enhance competitiveness.

The task ahead is indeed momentous. Rules of origin have frequently been identified as the root cause of underutilization of the long standing ACP-EU preference regime. Fortunately, the ACP States now have a historic opportunity to improve upon these rules in order to expand trade and development in their economies. However given the complexity of this issue, divergence in the negotiating strength of the two Parties and ACP regional variances, one wonders if ACP countries will be adequately prepared this year to negotiate reciprocal rules of origin using the value added methodology as the cornerstone of the negotiations.

Local Content and Joint Ventures

Over at This is Africa, this article proposes that by putting local content policies i.e. import substitution at the heart of development plans, governments in sub-Saharan Africa can make the most of their new found reserves e.g. oil, gas etc. My question; is this principle WTO compatible?

“Local content is the fastest, most sustainable way for the benefits of the oil and gas sector to accrue to a society,” says Kevin Warr, former head of the energy market development team at the US Agency for International Development. It guarantees jobs in the core sector – engineers, geologists, senior managers and the like – and stimulates domestic supply chains delivering everything from chemicals, boats and drills to catering, security and IT. In 2005, Royal Dutch Shell spent $9.2bn on goods and services from low and middle income countries. Chevron’s procurement reached $45bn worldwide in 2008.

Local content is not new to sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa’s post-apartheid Black Economic Empowerment programme, which offered preferential training and employment to black communities, was essentially a local content policy writ large. But formal legislation specific to oil and gas has picked up only recently. In 2003, the Angolan government passed a law requiring procurement of basic oil-related goods and services to be reserved for Angolan companies. A year later, Equatorial Guinea passed its own law addressing equity participation by nationals in international oil companies.

The full article can be assessed here.

Should we refer to this approach as local content, or joint venture policies? For instance China allowed foreign firms access the domestic market in exchange for technology transfer through joint production or joint ventures. In fact, 100% foreign owned firms were a rarity among the leading players in the industry. Most of the significant firms tended to be joint ventures between foreign firms and domestic (mostly state-owned) entities. See previous post on the role of joint ventures and investment in China's economic boom.

Inter-modal Linkages in Africa's Transport Sector

Intermodal transitions (in which freight is transferred from trucks to trains, trains to ships, or other modal combinations) is particularly time consuming and inefficient throughout Sub Saharan Africa (SSA).  In many cases, intermodal links are the main bottleneck for freight movement and for many SSA countries, the freight forwarding industry is entirely reliant on manual loading and unloading for intermodal transitions. This is in stark contrast to more developed economies.   

For example, improving intermodal links was a major factor in the export-driven development of Southeast Asian countries. Starting in the 1980s, these countries restructured their transport sectors into multimodal supply chain management sectors that took advantage of containerization and the internationalization of production.   Improvements in intermodal links in Southeast Asia were correlated with increased trade flows (especially of intermediate goods), increased integration into global production networks, and growth in domestic manufacturing sectors.

Intermodal connections can facilitate the vertical integration of commodity chains since logistics sectors typically evolve from a three-stage system of transporting commodities (from rural hinterlands to marketplaces, from marketplaces to ports, and then from ports to overseas markets) to integrated door-to-door supply chains;  a highly efficient system.  

Logistics and intermodal transitions are clearly areas where African countries need to enhance their transport sector efficiencies further.

Joint Ventures Key in China’s Export Growth

Foreign investors have played a key role in the evolution of China’s exports of consumer electronics. Over the past few decades, foreign investors in China were found to be the most productive of the producers, they were the source of technology, and they dominated exports. China’s openness to foreign investment and its willingness to create Special Economic Zones (SEZs) where foreign producers could operate with good infrastructure and with minimum hassles must therefore receive considerable credit. But if China has welcomed foreign companies, it has always done so with the objective of fostering domestic capabilities. To that end, China used a number of policies to ensure that technology transfer would take place and strong domestic players would emerge. Early on, reliance was placed predominantly on state-owned national champions. Later, the government used a variety of carrots and sticks. Foreign investors were required to enter into joint ventures using the Law of the People;s Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment with domestic firms (for instance in mobile phones and in computers).

There was also a role for tariffs. Domestic markets were protected to attract market-seeking investors, in addition to those that looked for cost savings. Weak enforcement of intellectual protection laws enabled domestic producers to reverse engineer and imitate foreign technologies. And localities were given substantial freedoms to fashion their own policies of stimulation and support, which led to the creation of industrial clusters in particular areas of the country.

On acquiring technology transfer and building local supply linkages, China’s strategy was clear: It allowed foreign firms access to the domestic market in exchange for technology transfer through joint production or joint ventures. In fact, 100% foreign owned firms were a rarity among the leading players in the industry. Most of the significant firms tended to be joint ventures between foreign firms and domestic (mostly state-owned) entities. A strong domestic producer base has however also been important in diffusing imported technologies and in creating domestic supply chains. Facilitating technology transfer requires a strong focus on Research and Development by the State. Without state support and publicly funded R&D, a company like Lenovo (previously known as Legend) which became large and profitable enough to purchase IBM’s PC business would never have come into being.

In sum, China has benefited both from good fundamentals—low labor and materials costs, “outward orientation” in the form of SEZs, large market size—and from a determined government effort to acquire domestic capabilities and build a modern industry. The large size of the economy has allowed policy experimentation. It also has allowed the government to use the carrot of the internal market to force foreign investors into joint ventures with domestic producers. If China is producing an increasingly sophisticated set of consumer electronics for instance, it would appear that this is due as much to the policy environment as it is to the free play of market forces.

For more on Special Economic Zones see here.