Showing posts with label BITS. Show all posts
Showing posts with label BITS. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 3, 2012

Bilateral Investment Treaties Entered Into by EAC States

EAC Partner States have entered into various Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) some of which are in force. This information is based on the UNCTAD Investment Database and it is noted that some of the BITs may no longer be in force. Hence for most current updates it is best to contact the Partner States themselves.  

Burundi has 5 BITs, Kenya 3 BITs (all EU), Rwanda 3 BITs, Tanzania 9 BITs (all European Economic Area (EEA) while Uganda has the most at 13 of which 8 are with EEA countries.  

As indicated most of the BITs are with EU countries notably Germany, UK, Belgium and the Netherlands.  Of the 34 BITs identified, 25 are with the EU region (almost 75%). Rwanda is the only country with a BIT with the US. Uganda has BITs  with other African countries e.g. Mozambique, Egypt, Sudan and Eritrea and is the only country with a BIT with China.  Burundi is indicated as having BITs with Mauritius and Comoros.

Below is an overall compilation of the BITs and the Parties. 

Burundi: Belgium, Germany, Mauritius, UK, Comoros and Netherlands
Kenya: Germany, UK, Netherlands
Rwanda: Belgium, Germany, US
Tanzania: Denmark, Switzerland, UK, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden
Uganda: Denmark, Egypt, France, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, Sweden, Germany, Belgium, Mozambique, Sudan, Eritrea, China

On global trends, its useful to note that the US and Germany are the top home sources of outflows of FDI while the US and China are the top host destinations for inflows of FDI (2010 data). Meanwhile the EAC and the US have concluded a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement which is a cooperative agreement. However, as a region, the EU is the world's leading host of FDI as well as the world's biggest source of FDI outside the EU. Consequently, the EU Member States together account for almost half of the investment agreements currently in force around the world (almost 1300).  See previous related post here on the new EU approach to investment and the EPA investment negotiations.

While international investment agreements have traditionally been negotiated by the relevant government ministry, there is now an emerging trend of inter-ministerial or inter-agency coordination. This process is particularly prominent at the European level and in EU member States. To the extent that countries are reviewing their BITs or that BITs need to undergo domestic ratification processes, the call for increasing transparency and inclusiveness of BIT-related decision-making is gaining additional traction.  Sectoral investment agreements are also a viable option where there is compelling justification to consider a BIT however using a more targeted and conservative approach.

Sunday, April 1, 2012

Rwanda-US Bilateral Investment Treaty and the EAC Common Market Protocol

The Rwanda-US Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) was signed in Kigali in 2008 and the United States Senate unanimously approved the treaty on September 26, 2011. Meanwhile, the EAC-US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) was signed in July 2008 between USTR and the EAC.  In addition, the EAC Common Market Protocol (CMP) to which Rwanda is a member came into force into force on 1st July 2010. 


The Rwanda-US BIT is the first to be concluded between the US and a sub-Saharan African country since 1998 (when a BIT was signed with Mozambique). Although there are over 40 BITs in force to which the US is a Party, this Treaty with Rwanda is only the second concluded on the basis of the ambitious 2004 U.S. model BIT. Other African countries with BITs currently in force with the US include: DRC, The Congo, Morocco, Senegal, Egypt, Cameroon and Tunisia. The BIT with Rwanda will remain in force for ten years after its entry into force and will continue in force unless terminated by a Party by providing one year’s advance notice to the other Party. 

The BIT provides investors with legal protections which include non-discriminatory treatment of investors and investments and the right to freely transfer investment-related funds.  Unlike the EAC CMP however, the BIT also provides for prompt, adequate, and effective compensation in the event of an expropriation; freedom from specified performance requirements, such as domestic content or technology transfer requirements; and provisions to ensure transparency in governance. The BIT also gives investors in all sectors the right to bring investment disputes to neutral international arbitration panels.  

In comparison, EAC CMP Article 29 on the Protection of Cross-Border Investments, undertakes to protect investors and their returns in a non-discriminatory manner however the modalities for doing so are not yet finalised. Article 29:3 proposes that within 2 years after the coming into force of the CMP, Partner States will take measures to ensure necessary protections in the Community.


In contrast, the EAC-US TIFA establishes a EAC-US Council On Trade and Investment to monitor trade, identify and remove impediments to trade and investment.

The BIT contains provisions on National Treatment and Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment whereby it protects investors of a Party and their covered investments from discriminatory measures by the other Party during the full life-cycle of an investment, including the establishment phase. Each Party commits to provide to investors of the other Party and to their covered investments treatment no less favorable than that which it provides, in like circumstances, to its own investors (National Treatment) or to investors from any third country and their investments (MFN Treatment). In this instance, Rwanda has committed in the BIT to give US investors similar treatment it is providing to EAC Partner States, in like circumstances, under the Common Market Protocol. 

In contrast however, the EAC CMP Article 13 on the Right of Establishment, EAC States have committed to the principle of MFN but not the principle of National Treatment. However in Article 16 on the Free Movement of Services, the principles of MFN and National Treatment are addressed. Hence National Treatment is applicable in the EAC CMP for investment in the services sectors but seemingly not investment in industrial sectors e.g. agriculture, manufacturing, hunting, and forestry, mining and quarrying, energy production/transmission and distribution. 

On Transfers, the BIT has free transfer obligations which require that a Party permit capital and other transfers related to an investment be made freely both into and out of its territory. Additionally, a Party must permit transfers to be made in a ‘‘freely usable currency,’’ as designated by the IMF, at the market rate prevailing at the time of the transfer. Parties may however prevent transfers through the equitable and non-discriminatory application of certain laws. The EAC CMP on the other hand has provisions on the Free Movement of Capital Articles 24-28 which corresponds to the CMP Schedule on the Removal of Restrictions on Free Movement of Capital (Annex VI).

On Performance Requirements, the BIT prohibits the imposition by the Parties of several requirements relating to the performance of investments, including a requirement to achieve a given level of exports or domestic content or requirements linking the value of imports or domestic sales by an investment to the level of its export or foreign exchange earnings. The Article also prohibits Parties from offering advantages, such as tax holidays, in exchange for a more limited set of performance requirements. In the WTO context, the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) takes a similar prohibitive approach however only in the context of trade in goods. 

So as not to place U.S. and Rwandan investors at a competitive disadvantage, the disciplines on performance requirements also apply to all investments in the territory (non-discrimination) of a Party, including those owned or controlled by host-country investors (domestic investors) and those owned by non-Parties. The EAC CMP does not impose performance requirements however it would seem that by virtue of the BIT, Rwanda cannot impose such measures even in the services sectors vis a vie any third Party. In practice, Rwanda may want as a policy to impose some performance requirements e.g. the technology transfer in targeted sectors, vis a vie more developed countries and justifiably so, in order to meet key development objectives.  This provision is therefore not in the interest of Rwanda given her level of development. It should be mentioned that the development of China is linked to performance requirements (local content) the Chinese government put in place for foreign investors. See related piece here. Fortunately however Rwanda has exempted performance requirements in her Annex II on non conforming measures (discussed below).

On Senior Management and Boards of Directors, the BIT prohibits measures requiring that persons of any particular nationality be appointed to senior management positions in a covered investment. A Party may require that a majority of the board of directors of a covered investment be of a particular nationality, or that a director be a resident of the host country, so long as such requirements do not materially impair an investor’s control over its investment. This provision would prevent Rwanda from implementing broad-based local empowerment policy to foster development of its own nationals into senior management positions and fortunately Rwanda exempted this in her list of non conforming measures (discussed below). Meanwhile in this context, the EAC CMP does not discipline the composition of Boards of Directors and the nationality of Senior Management by virtue of the principles of free movement of workers and right of establishment. The CMP only requires that juridical persons be established in accordance with the national laws of a Partner State.  

In the Publication of Laws and Decisions the provisions in the BIT seek to promote transparency in the legal framework governing investment. It requires the Parties to ensure that laws, regulations, procedures, administrative rulings of general application, and adjudicatory decisions that relate to any matter covered by the Treaty are promptly published or otherwise made publicly available. The EAC CMP contains a mildly similar provision in the Free Movement of Services chapter Article 19 whereby notification is required but not publication and the notification only applies after the introduction of the measure. 

In the BIT, each Party is obligated, to the extent possible, to publish in advance any laws, regulations, procedures, or administrative rulings of general application with respect to matters covered by the Treaty that the Party proposes to adopt, and to provide interested persons and the other Party a reasonable opportunity to comment on the proposed measures. In the EAC CMP, provisions on advance publication and comments are not addressed.  In practice this means that the US would have the opportunity to view, comment  and make recommendations in advance, on Rwanda's proposed laws and regulations however EAC Partner States would not.


On the rules of origin (Denial of Benefits) the BIT establishes that a Party may deny the benefits of the Treaty to an investor of the other Party if persons of a third country own or control the enterprise and the denying Party either (1) has no diplomatic relations with the third country; or (2) adopts or maintains measures, such as foreign policy sanctions, with respect to the third country or to a person of the third country that prohibit transactions with the enterprise or that would be violated or circumvented if the benefits of the Treaty were accorded to the enterprise or to its investments. This provision impacts on third Parties that are on sanctioned lists of either Party.

The provisions on Denial of Benefits also establishes that a Party may deny the benefits of the Treaty to an investor of the other Party if the enterprise has no substantial business activities in the territory of the other Party and persons of a third country, or of the denying Party, own or control the enterprise. 

The Agreement also lists Non-Conforming Measures (equivalent to negative lists) and in these Annexes, each Party lists existing measures to which any or all of four key obligations of the Treaty do not apply, and sectors or activities in which each Party reserves the right to adopt future measures to which any or all of those obligations will not apply. Annex III of the BIT is reserved for financial services NCMs. 

Annex I:


Rwanda: Exemption from MFN and National treatment in all sectors to allow for differential minimum capital requirements for investment registration. Here Rwanda identifies "local investors" to include Rwandese and COMESA investors who are entitled to a lower capital threshold (USD 100,000) than "foreign investors" (USD 250,000). While EAC is not mentioned in the BIT given the common market was not yet in place, one can argue that the EAC falls in the "local investor" category since the common market is technically working towards a single market.

United States: Atomic Energy; Mining; Air Transportation; Customs Brokers; Radiocommunications Licenses; and restrictions on securities registration and OPIC insurance eligibility. 

Annex II 

Rwanda: Preferences for socially or economically disadvantaged communities and differential treatment pursuant to existing international treaties. Here Rwanda reserves the right to adopt  measures in all sectors that are not consistent with the provisions on National Treatment, Performance Requirements and Senior Management and Boards of Directors in order to accord rights or preferences to socially or economically disadvantaged communities. 


Rwanda also reserves the right in all sectors to deviate from MFN provisions in order to adopt or maintain any measure that accord differential treatment to countries under any bilateral or multilateral international agreement in force or signed before the BIT. For agreements signed or in force after the date of entry into force of BIT, Rwanda reserved the right to deviate from MFN treatment with regard to: (a) aviation; (b) fisheries; and (c) telecommunications.  

United States: Radio/Satellite Communications, Cable Television, Social Services, Minority Affairs, measures relating to U.S.-flagged maritime vessels, and differential treatment pursuant to existing international treaties. 

Annex III 

Rwanda: On insurance, Rwanda states that the entry shall cease to have effect on the earlier of: (i) the date that Rwanda enacts an insurance law that eliminates the non-conforming aspects of the measure as set forth above;' or (ii) September 1, 2009.

United States: Financial Services/Banking, Insurance, and general Financial Services. 

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Overall the US has more detailed sector specific Non Conforming Measures than Rwanda especially in the services sectors (transport (maritime, aviation), communication (audio visual, telecom), financial services (banking, insurance and other financial services). However Rwanda also made useful exemptions but at a sectoral level made general carve-outs in insurance, aviation, telecommunications and fisheries.  

The key take away from this comparison is the Rwanda-US BIT is highly asymmetrical and is more ambitious than the EAC CMP. Theoretically it can prejudice the regional processes given its objectives of MFN, National Treatment, Dispute Settlement (including Expropriation, Compensation), Intrusion in Law Making Processes (governance) and broad-based elimination of: performance requirements, empowerment measures including elimination of legitimate development oriented requirements for foreign investment and repatriation. 


Whether such comprehensive coverage is desirable for African countries is an important question, the answer to which is highly context- and situation-specific, and needs to be assessed against the overall objective of ensuring that investment treaties promote investment that actually exists or has the compelling potential to exist and that fosters sustainable development. The propensities to invest and hence the need for protection through an ambitious BIT is an important consideration before signing BITs as such needs may change over time. In closing its important to note that several countries receiving high FDI receipts in Africa e.g. Angola, Sudan have very few BITs and in a previous post we found that strict FDI provisions in BITs do not increase investment.

Thursday, March 8, 2012

Bileateral Investment Treaties (BITs) Coming Back To Bite

Published by TIA

See related blog post on ICSID

African governments once rushed into signing Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) to encourage FDI. Lawyers are however now calling for new models.

With much of Africa’s investment coming from abroad, how governments manage complaints from foreign companies is a vital determinant of the business environment. For decades, foreign investors depended on diplomatic protection from home governments in their overseas adventures, which occasionally gave rise to “gunboat diplomacy”. The US, for example, sent troops into Latin America 34 times to settle commercial disputes.

Since the 1960s, and spiking in the 1990s, a more formal investment approach was attempted in the form of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). These state-to-state agreements establish how governments handle investors from each other’s country, covering fair and equitable treatment, security, and compensation for expropriation, in assets but also, in some cases, in shares, stocks, bonds and other modalities. While BITs infringe sovereignty, in that disputes are settled in international tribunals and not domestic courts, many developing countries saw them as a way of signalling their attractiveness for foreign investment.

The number of treaties has grown exponentially, to around 2,500 today. The number of claims is growing too. Philip Morris, Total, Mobil, Shell, Siemens and Cargill have all taken states to arbitration, with Sri Lanka suffering the first award against a developing country in 1990. Twenty-six percent of new claims in 2010 had an African or Middle Eastern state party involved. In Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Namibia, Liberia, Algeria and Senegal have all faced actions. There are likely to be more disputes in areas such as mining, water and agriculture, according to Mahnaz Malik, an investment arbitration lawyer at the Chambers of Arthur Marriott QC at 12 Gray’s Inn Square. She warns that events such as the Arab Spring can generate a flood of claims.

But so far, South Africa is arguably the most prominent in the African context. Pretoria signed 30 BITs post-1994 to attract private investment. The new government had inherited a society that was among the most unequal in the world, where the vast majority of black South Africans had been excluded from meaningful economic activity under apartheid. As part of a set of initiatives to redress this inheritance and to meet the government’s constitutional obligation to create a more open and equitable society based on human rights, Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) programmes were initiated.

In 2007, a group of investors from Italy and Luxembourg filed a claim at the Convention of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), arguing that South Africa’s 2002 Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) contained provisions that amounted to expropriation of their mineral rights, thus violating the BITs South Africa had signed with both countries. The MPRDA, a separate piece of legislation from BEE that aims to transform the minerals industry in South Africa, requires that holders of mineral rights undertake equity or equity-equivalent obligations; requirements emerging from consultations between the government and relevant parties, including representatives of the claimants. The South African government defended the MPRDA by arguing that it protected existing mineral rights and allowed for their uninterrupted use so long as companies also met the government’s wider transformational obligations in some accepted combination. In a punitive judgment, the Icsid tribunal dismissed the claimant’s case, ordered them to pay the legal costs of the South African government, and prevented claimants from bringing any such action again in future.

On the basis of similar reviews conducted internationally, notably, in the US, Norway, and certain Latin American states, South Africa launched a lengthy BIT review, the conclusion of which is that the country will not enter any new treaties unless there are “compelling economic reasons”, says Xavier Carim, deputy director general of the international trade and economic development division of South Africa’s Department of Trade and Industry. “The very fact that narrow, shortsighted commercial interests can subject progressive and laudable government policies to international arbitration, the outcomes of which are unpredictable, creates unacceptable risks that can have a chilling impact on legitimate public policy making,” he says, noting that there have been inconsistencies in the rulings taken by tribunals over similar cases.

It would be simplistic to characterise BITs as simply giving rise to clashes between progressive government policy and corporate interests. In some cases, such as a SOABI v. Senegal dispute, the problem was a largely technical disagreement over terms and conditions of a low cost housing programme.

In Zimbabwe, cases have been brought in objection to the ruling Zanu-PF party’s arbitrary and at times violent land reform programme. Broad and ambiguous terms have been a central problem of many agreements, says Jansen Calamita, senior research fellow in international trade and investment law at the British Institute of Comparative and International Law. “BITs are an agreement by the host state to accept the application of external standards to determine the legality of its actions – standards above and beyond the state’s constitution and national law. If the standards agreed are not clear – as they largely are not – it will be left to tribunals to give meaning and effect to those standards.”

Some lawyers believe the first wave of BITs were signed too fast, with text penned by a closely-knit group of Western lawyers. The majority of BITs reflect the texts developed to promote the 1960s anti-communist, post-decolonisation protection agenda for European investors, says Ms Malik. She believes capacity to understand complex investment law issues is not always present in developing country negotiators. She notes that the imbalance becomes more acute as negotiations are often based on the developed country’s model. In a speech at the London School of Economics, Randall Williams of the South African Trade Department claimed to have seen negotiators making agreements without the presence of a lawyer.

Latin American governments have come out strongly in opposition to prevailing norms. In 2009, Ecuador’s vice minister of foreign affairs, Lautaro Pozo, said BITs reflected a “fifty year old ideology” and that many countries signed them without sufficient understanding of their implications. BITs did not, in his reckoning, reflect the objectives of developing states, especially on issues of the environment and human rights.

In one case, Philip Morris tried to sue Uruguay for copyright infringement when it ruled that cigarette packets needed to carry health warnings. Bolivian President Evo Morales claims that international arbitration offends state sovereignty, with Bolivia, Ecuador and most recently Venezuela denouncing Icsid, the Washington-based arbitration body, part of the World Bank Group, which settles nearly half of claims. India and Mexico have both refused to be party to the Icsid Convention, and Brazil has not ratified any BITs.

Others are more upbeat. “I think the backlash against investment treaties is overstated,” says Anthony Sinclair, a partner at law firm Allen & Overy. “Countries continue to sign these treaties at a rate of about 50 a year.” Mr Sinclair acknowledges there is “fine-tuning and recalibrating” of text, especially in terms of public interest regulation. “At the same time, countries are in search of growth, for which foreign investment is key.”

There is no credible analysis proving the effect of BITs on investment, which would be very hard to quantify. Furthermore, BITs are not the sole determinant of investment. China is a prolific signatory, but continues to invest in countries without BITs – in contrast to Germany, where risk insurance is only issued to companies if they are operating in a country with a German treaty. Yet whenever governments and investors are discussing major cross-border investment, “everybody” on both sides is talking about investment treaties, Mr Sinclair claims.

The focus on treaties should not draw attention away from domestic reforms which could lessen the investment risk. Guinea-Bissau has undertaken domestic reform, turning a single court system dealing with everything from divorces to commercial disputes, into a more differentiated structure with commercial courts run by appropriately trained legal teams and judges, says Raimundo Pereira, speaker of the Parliament of Guinea-Bissau. Nonetheless, bilateral frameworks do appear to be of growing importance to investors.

Despite the frustrations, there is little that can be done about existing treaties until they expire, at which point clearer text can be negotiated, or countries can withdraw. Pulling out of active treaties altogether is unlikely. Even South Africa has not done so, given the diplomatic downsides. The goal of African legal teams is to improve the text in future agreements.

To date, many African governments employed international law firms to advise on treaties. While this helps buffet their expertise in negotiations, capacity-building of African government lawyers is needed. Rukia Baruti recently founded the African International Legal Awareness (AILA) programme, which in late 2011 organised a week long BIT training workshop. Participants included lawyers from Liberia, Ghana, Uganda, the Gambia, Egypt and South Africa. Baruti organised the workshop, held in London, after attending an investment conference in Mauritius, where many African attendees were unfamiliar with investment treaty arbitration.

“By building capacity and increasing awareness of the consequences of concluding investment treaties, African states will, before signing such treaties, carefully examine the meaning and consider the provisions. This would go a long way to avoiding disputes involving African states.”  Mr Sinclair speaks approvingly of AILA, in which his firm participated. “There is no shortage of good will on the part of international lawyers to contribute on a pro bono basis. The issue is whether there are enough people with sufficient inspiration and energy, like Rukia, to organise these activities. Otherwise busy lawyers in firms or chambers, or in academic careers, may not be able to produce something like this themselves.”

Aila has since been approached by African governments to deliver training in-country. Similarly, the International Institute for Sustainable Development has conducted training courses for African government officials in country and at a regional level.  It is important to note that while bilateral treaties have been overwhelmingly North-South in the past, that is changing in reflection of growing South-South economic interaction. Current BITs between developing countries include Mozambique-Indonesia, Djibouti-China and Eritrea-Uganda. South-South deals provide a platform to create more development-orientated texts, but often the European template is copied over. Regional treaties on the other hand tend to create more bespoke texts.

“I have found that debate is healthier in regional dynamics compared to a bilateral context,” says Ms Malik. A recent COMESA Agreement treaty contains more nuanced obligations than those found typically in bilateral treaties, she claims, including provisions to allow tribunals to take greater account of the development status of the host state. The COMESA treaty also omitted the full protection and security standard, a controversial feature in many BITs which puts hefty responsibilities on states. Algeria was taken to tribunal to pay damages related to civil unrest during the civil war. Similarly, Congo faced a claim for riots on the streets of Kinshasa.

The COMESA treaty, and new model texts, exhibit the potential for designing modern templates, says Ms Malik. “It shows African countries that they are not tied to the old European model. It paves the way for innovation in terms of making the treaties better balanced.”

Published by TIA : 05 March, 2012

Sunday, August 8, 2010

Investment Arbitration- ICSID

At ICSID this year, there have been investment dispute developments involving African parties to Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), such as: South Africa's Mining dispute under the Italy-South Africa BIT and Belgo-Luxembourg-South Africa BIT; Egypt's hotel industry dispute under the Denmark-Egypt BIT; Ghana's cocoa production dispute under the Germany-Ghana BIT. Previously, we considered a working paper by the WTO, which found that stricter dispute settlement provisions in BITs do not necessarily result in higher FDI inflows.

ICSID is the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes which is an autonomous international institution, considered the leading international arbitration institution devoted to investor-State dispute settlement. ICSID's Membership consists of one hundred and forty  four (144) member States that have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval of the Convention and have become ICSID Contracting States.  Overall however, there are currently 155 signatory States to the ICSID ConventionThe ICSID Convention is a multilateral treaty formulated by the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank). It was opened for signature on March 18, 1965 and entered into force on October 14, 1966. 

ICSID has released this years caseload statistics Report, which shows that: 

Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITS) have a usage rate of 62% and thereby form the substantial basis for consent invoked to establish ICSID's jurisdiction in registered cases. Other legal basis for consent includes: investment contracts between the host state and investor (22%); investment laws of the host state (5%); free trade agreements e.g. NAFTA (6%) and the Energy Charter Treaty (5% )


Click Figures to enlarge.

  
The South American region has the largest number of disputes handled at 30% while Sub Saharan Africa's caseload is 16%, and is the third highest after Eastern Europe and Central Asia (22%).


In terms of sectors, gas, oil, mining (25%) and electricity and other energy (13%) and transport (11%) sectors  have the highest number of disputes.  Other highly disputed sectors are water, sanitation and flood protection (8%), finance (8%) and construction (7%).

The distribution of appointments of Arbitrators, Conciliators and ad hoc Committee Members appointed in ICSID Cases is about three quarters (71%) from the west i.e. North America (23%) and Europe (48%), while the rest of the world shares a quarter. Latin America holds a 10% share while Sub Saharan Africa takes a share of only 2%.
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This Report can be accessed here.

In a previous discussion we considered the EC's proposal to accede to the ICSID Convention as part of its new EC Wide investment policy. However that would require the modification of the Convention which currently, is open only to Member States of the World Bank and any State which is a party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, on the invitation of the ICSID Administrative Council by a vote of two-third of its members.  

Friday, July 9, 2010

New EU-Wide Investment Policy

As a region, the EU is the most significant global investment player. It is the world's leading host of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as well as the world's biggest source of FDI outside the EU. By 2008 outward stocks of the EU FDI amounted to € 3.3 trillion while EU inward stocks accounted for € 2.4 trillion. 


According to a recent press statement, the EC has now formulated a comprehensive investment policy which will seek to integrate investment liberalisation and investment protection.  Under the Lisbon Treaty, investment is one of the areas covered by the EU common commercial policy which is developed and managed at the European level giving the EU a strengthened negotiating leverage. However, there are 1200 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) concluded by individual EU Member States and other countries. In addition, the European Commission (EC) as a legal entity is also negotiating investment agreements, for instance with African countries, as part of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). 

To address this anomaly, the  EC has released a comprehensive investment package which consists of: 

(2) a draft regulation which sets up transitional arrangements offering guarantees to existing or pending BITs concluded between EU and Non-EU countries prior to the enforcement of the Lisbon Treaty. Here, the Commission has provided legal security for European and foreign investors, without hampering the EU's ability to negotiate new investment treaties at EU level.  

The EU Member States together account for almost half of the investment agreements currently in force around the world. However, not all Member States have concluded such agreements, and not all agreements provide for the same high or equivalent level of standards. According to the EC, this leads to an uneven playing field for EU companies investing abroad, depending on whether they are covered as a "national" (granted national treatment) under a certain Member State BIT or not. 


Another feature of the agreements of individual EU Member States is that they relate to the treatment of investors “post-entry” or “post-establishment” only. This implies that Member States’ BITs provide no specific binding commitments regarding the conditions of entry, neither from third countries regarding outward investment by companies originating in EU Member States, nor vice versa. Here the EC might want to be guaranteed non discriminatory pre-establishment MFN Status.  Gradually, the European Union has begun the process of filling the gap of "entry" or "admission" through both multilateral and bilateral agreements at EU level, covering investment market access and investment liberalization, ensuring the non-discriminatory treatment of investors upon entry to a third country market.

The EC recognizes that a one-size-fits-all model for investment agreements with 3rd countries would be neither feasible nor desirable. Therefore the EC will have to take into account each specific negotiating context. However since actual trade and investment flows are in and of themselves important determinants for defining priorities, the EC indicates that they should go where its investors would like to go, through the liberalisation of investment flows. The policy paper identifies some candidates for a full investment agreement including India, Canada, Mercosur and where possible China and Russia, but also states that should a comprehensive, across-the-board, investment agreement with a country, or a set of countries, prove impossible or inadvisable, sectoral agreements may be an option whose desirability, feasibility and possible impact would have to be further assessed.

On the specifics of the approach, the EC would look beyond FDI and protect all the operations that accompany investment and make it possible in practice e.g. payments, the protection of intangible assets such as Intellectual Property Rights, etc. Enforcement is also addressed and identified as a key issue in the new policy. Currently, the EC has included in all of its recent FTAs, an effective and expedient state-to-state dispute settlement system. In addition, investor-state dispute settlement will be featured since it is a key part of the inheritance that the Union receives from its Member State BITs.  

However there is a uniqueness of investor-state dispute settlement in international economic law which impacts the EC's mandate in this area. For example, the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID Convention), is open to signature and ratification by Member States of the World Bank or those party to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The European Commission does not qualify under either.  This new investment policy paper however proposes that the EC could seek accession to the ICSID, but notes that this would require modification of its convention.


A key outcome of this policy is that the EC may request renegotiation of existing BITs by individual member States. "The Commission will review the existing MS BITs. If it finds clauses that are incompatible with EU law (e.g. transfer clauses that would hamper the implementation of EU financial restrictions against a certain third country), it would ask the Member State to renegotiate such clause. If this proves impossible, the authorisation may be withdrawn as a matter of last resort.  Likewise, authorisations can be withdrawn if the EU negotiates an investment treaty at European level, and recourse to Member State BITs with the same third country is not necessary anymore."

While FDI will be within the full competence of the EC, the expectation is that by following available best practices, they would ensure that no EU investor would be worse off than they would be under Member States' BITs. Member States will however have scope to pursue and implement investment promotion policies that complement and fit well alongside the common international investment policy. In addition, BITs maintained by Member States may require amendments in order to bring them in compliance with EU law. The same framework is intended to be available also for Member States that would like to negotiate and conclude new investment treaties with countries, which are not targeted for EU-wide investment agreements, e.g. for foreign policy purposes.  

Overall, this is an interesting development in the wake of the EPA services and investment negotiations and should be studied carefully in light of the scope of the EC's investment text which covers all economic sectors including services i.e.: A) Agriculture, hunting and forestry; B) Fishing; C) Mining and quarrying; D) Manufacturing; and E) Production, transmission and distribution on own account of electricity, gas, steam and hot water. It is therefore useful to note that sectoral agreements rather than comprehensive investment agreements could be considered a viable option where feasible. 


One should also note that on "policy space" the EC's approach will be to ensure that the EU common investment policy fits in with the way the EU and its Member States regulate economic activity within the Union and across its borders. ...."EU investment policy has to be consistent with the other policies of the Union and its Member States, including policies on the protection of the environment, health and safety at work, consumer protection, cultural diversity, development policy and competition policy.African States negotiating investment chapters in the EPA could opt to also ensure compatibility of proposed EPA investment provisions with their own development policies.