EPZs and SEZs

The transformation of the policy, legal and regulatory framework of Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in Kenya will see them converted to Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and replicated in all 47 counties in the country. See more here.

The SEZ concept has evolved globally to include a wider range of economic activities with the aim of accelerating growth and development as opposed to only focusing on manufacturing for export. SEZs have been adopted in other countries such as China, Mauritius, Egypt and India and have widened the range of activities included in the economic zones to also accommodate companies with a domestic market orientation and those in the services industry. In Kenya the SEZ will widen the domestic market to include the EAC. 

The move from EPZ towards economic zones in Kenya will require the current EPZ Act to be amended. Further, there will be a need for the harmonization of the new Act with other government Acts and policies that may be hindering investment and effective investor facilitation in the zones.  A sound legal and regulatory framework is a necessary first step for a successful zone program, particularly one designed around private sector development and operations.

According to previous article found here on SEZs, China used a number of policies to ensure that technology transfer would take place domestically through the SEZ, through joint ventures between foreign investors and local firms and that strong domestic players would emerge. In fact, 100% foreign owned firms were a rarity among the leading players in the industry in China and the goverment can be applauded for a determined effort to capture and acquire domestic capabilities to build modern industries. 

According to the World Export Processing Zones Authority (WEPZA) zones have generally failed to have a catalytic effect in most African countries in part because they have been disconnected from wider economic strategies; they are often put in place and then left to operate on their own, with little effort to support domestic investment in the zones or to promote links, training, or upgrading. Unlocking the potential of zones appears to require clear strategic integration of the program as well as active government leadership to facilitate the positive impact of the zone.  According to the WEPZA, in Africa few, if any, appear to treat the zone programs as an important pillar of wider economic growth, industrialization, and trade strategy.

In addition, high-level, active government commitment to zone programs is a significant contributor to their success. This support must be consistent over the long term: The evidence from even the most successful zone programs suggests that it normally takes 5–10 years after zones launch (thus, possibly 15 years or more from when a project was first conceived) before a zone begins to show signs of success. In analyzing the East Asian successes with economic zones, the role of political leadership— in terms of both vision and active support along the path of planning, implementation, and operation—is clear. African zone programs have largely failed to secure this kind of consistent and active commitment from senior political leaders. 

 

In cclosing, successful programs such as those in Mauritius, Malaysia, and China use their zones as part of a group of instruments designed to promote wider economic policy reform, diversification, and upgrading. They also have strong governmental leadership.

For previous post on EPZs in Kenya see here

Some thoughts on Brexit and EPA

Tanzania seems to be more or less backing out of the EAC EPA with the EU over the Brexit vote among other economic reasons. The UK as a state is a signatory to the EPA agreement in addition to the European community and other EU member states. Hence the EPA agreement is of a bilateral character in relation to the UK. However EPAs are also  mixed agreements concluded ‘of the one part’ by the EU and its Member States and, ‘of the other part’, the ACP signatory. In this regard the rolling over of EU FTA arrangements so that they continue to apply to the UK and the ACP signatory only after Brexit shouldn't be difficult for ACP signatories to negotiate with the UK. Some call it negotiating for EPA equivalence with the UK. This kind of “rolling over” of treaty obligations is a familiar process in international law and shouldn't be a bottleneck for Tanzania or the ACP Member States in the short to medium term. However it may involve and allow for renegotiation of at least some of the EPA provisions.

See previous EPA post below.

Tanzanian MPs Vote Against the EAC EPA and Suit Filed at EACJ

Tanzanian MPs have voted against the country signing the EAC Economic Partnership Agreement. Tanzania’s reluctance to endorse the EPA, after 10 years of negotiations, is based on three issues — chinese driven industrialization policy and revenue losses in the 2016/17 national budget.  Tanzania is also concerned by Britain’s decision to quit the EU, saying Britain is its main trading partner and it makes no sense to enter into a deal with the European bloc without London. 

Apparently President Magufuli could still ignore the MPs’ advice and push for the signing of the EPA. Will see what happens.

Meanwhile a Tanzanian national has filed a civil suit with the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) to stop the EAC and remaining members  states of the EAC Burundi, Ugandan and South Sudan from signing the EPA. (Rwanda and Kenya have already signed). The EACJ's major responsibility is to ensure the adherence to law in the interpretation and application of and compliance with the EAC Treaty. Article 30 of the EAC Treaty allows the court to have reference to civil suits by natural and legal persons. The suit filed in October 2017 says that further signature will allow ratification and regional application of the agreement, which will most likely undermine industrialization policies and tariff regimes and displace EAC products from the market.

See more here.

Proposed Levy on Imports to Finance EAC Secretariat

From Business Daily. See more here.

The cost of imported goods looks set to rise as the East Africa Heads of State agreed on a new import levy to finance secretariat operations which have long been hit by unreliable donations and member subscriptions.

The Heads of State on Wednesday called for the conclusion of a more sustainable financing plan for the EAC budget.

The summit directed the council to finalise the work on the modalities required to establish a sustainable financing mechanism for the East African Community based on various options, including a hybrid of a levy and equal contribution with a commitment to increase the budget, that encompasses the principles of equity, solidarity and equality, and submit a report to the next summit for consideration.

EAC Treaty Articles 132:4 and 133 state that the EAC budget shall be funded by equal contributions by the Partner States and receipts from regional and international donations and any other sources as may be determined by the Council. Other resources shall include grants, donations, funds for projects and programmes, technical assistance and income earned from activities undertaken by the Community. 

The region’s council of ministers has previously proposed that member states should consider levying one per cent import duty on goods from non-member states.

The push for a new levy could come with pain for consumers in Kenya and other EAC countries where most of essential goods attract value added tax (VAT) after governments scrapped previous exemptions. 

Consumers in Kenya are already subjected to the recently introduced 1.5 per cent railway development levy (RDL) and the 2.5 per cent import declaration fee charged by the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA). 

The additional one per cent levy would push up the prices for imports — including inputs for making essential commodities. 

Kenya in 2014 unsuccessfully tried to impose the RDL on all imports passing through the port of Mombasa. 

The KRA was forced to review the RDL collections after regional traders filed a complaint with the EAC Council of Ministers citing breaches to the regional common market protocol. 

A regional lobby group, the East African Business Council (EABC), argued that the 1.5 per cent levy imposed on imports was inconsistent with the EAC Customs Union Protocol, because it is a charge of equivalent effect that partner states agreed to remove. 

The customs union protocol enables goods produced within the region to be sold across the borders without duty while imports from non-EAC states are subjected to a three-band common external tariff structure. 

Raw materials attract no duty, intermediate goods are charged at 10 per cent while finished products are allowed into the region at 25 per cent tariff. 

Kenyan traders further said the RDL, which KRA imposed on top of other levies such as the 2.5 per cent import declaration fee, was tilting the competition landscape in the shared market in favour of their neighbours. 

KRA gave in to the pressure in early March 2014 and ordered all its officers to stop imposing levy on goods entering Kenya from the other four member states of the EAC.

Vietnam and Malaysia predicted to be winners of TPP agreement

The Trans-Pacific Partnership involves 12pacific rim countries but some look set to benefit more than others from the agreement, with Vietnam and Malaysia singled out as two likely winners. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a trade agreement concerning a variety of matters of economic policy, which was reached on 5 October 2015 after 7 years of negotiations. 

Each of the 12 countries that signed up to the landmark Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement expects to benefit greatly from a deal that will open up a vast new market of 800 million people for their products and spans a large portion of the globe. However, none has higher expectations than Vietnam, which experts say has emerged as the big winner of the TPP agreement, with Malaysia as the runner-up, in the struggle to boost exports and attract FDI. 

The agreement’s 30 chapters cover various trade and trade-related issues, including reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers in sectors as diverse as agriculture, industrial goods, pharmaceuticals, service industries, financial services and telecommunications. 

The agreement also deals with investment, intellectual property, labour, the environment, good governance and methods for dispute settlement. Novel features of the agreement include addressing the roles of state-sponsored enterprises and e-commerce, and its commitment to assisting small and medium-sized enterprises so that they benefit from the new trade openings. It will also work towards facilitating the development of production and supply chains and seamless trade.

FDI boost

That so many countries – Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the US and Vietnam – at such different levels of development were able to reach agreement on so many complex and domestically sensitive issues is remarkable. 

The TPP, though primarily about trade, is also expected to generate a significant increase in FDI. Indeed, its chapter on investment specifically emphasises that each country’s markets and services sector will be fully open to foreign investors – unless the country has put a specific sector on a 'negative list' that is not open to foreign investment.

“The big winners on trade are likely to be the big winners on investment, especially over a 10-year period,” says Dr Gary Hufbauer, a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, DC.

In percentage terms, Mr Hufbauer expects Vietnam to be a big winner in both categories because it is coming from far behind the rest of the field. In addition, its tariffs on many imports – among the highest in the TPP trade area – will be lowered or eliminated. To get the maximum benefit from the TPP, Mr Hufbauer says Vietnam will need better technology and financial services, both of which will require FDI. “If Vietnam carries through on the reforms in the TPP, it will get a ton of investment,” he says.

Vietnam’s burgeoning textile and apparel sector, which currently exports about $17.5bn-worth of goods a year, is expected to benefit most under the TPP. Its other major exports are telephones, consumer electronics, footwear and seafood.

The Nafta effect

Mr Hufbauer expects that under the TPP, Vietnam could enjoy the benefits of “the Nafta effect”, which enabled Mexico to increase the FDI it received from $3bn to $4bn a year to $15bn to $20bn annually after Mexico, the US and Canada signed the North American Free Trade Agreement. To get the full benefit of the TPP, however, both Vietnam and Malaysia will need to improve their infrastructure and tackle corruption, he says.

Dr Deborah Elms, executive director of the Asian Trade Centre in Singapore, is also bullish on Vietnam. “The consequences of the TPP for the [Vietnamese] economy are huge. A lot of the reforms they have to make are hard and challenging. By using TPP as the mechanism to get reforms done, we are more likely to see them,” she says. 

Inward FDI has already begun, she adds, with large-scale investors from China, South Korea and Indonesia already moving to Vietnam to take advantage of the TPP. Ms Elms points out that the trade benefits of the TPP are based on where the product is made, not on the country in which the corporate headquarters are located. Therefore companies with operations in other countries are likely to move those operations to locations within the TPP to benefit from zero or lowered tariff barriers on their products. 

Malaysia too has high hopes for the TPP. It sees a competitive advantage for its key exports of electrical and electronics goods, as well as chemical, palm oil, rubber, wood, textiles and automotive products. In a statement, the Malaysian government reported that a number of foreign companies in non-TPP countries were exploring Malaysia as a base for their operations to take advantage of the agreement.

Sector winners

The TPP also opens up vast new opportunities for the services sector in member countries – an arena in which the US is extremely competitive, says Ms Elms. The agreement states that member countries’ markets must be fully open to services, except those on the 'negative list'. 'Services' include professional services such as legal and accounting, as well as retail and restaurants, travel and tourism, and telecommunications. At the same time, Ms Elms expects openings to be created for domestic companies to become competitive.

Another industry she expects to benefit from the TPP is the food and agricultural sector, where markets are traditionally very protected and closed to foreign products. Tariffs will be eliminated or reduced over time, food will not have to be repeatedly tested as it crosses borders, and special rules will expedite the processing of perishable goods through customs. Ms Elms expects these advantages to attract FDI, especially in food processing. 

“If a company can figure out how to take advantage of this agreement, the upside is great. But it takes a fair amount of effort to figure out what is in it and how to harness it,” she says.

It will also take a fair amount of effort for each of the 12 governments that signed the deal to get their parliaments to go along with it. In each country there are powerful groups that see their own special interests as being damaged, whether in the agricultural, biopharmaceutical or automotive sectors. Labour groups also worry that production will be outsourced to workers in low-wage countries. US presidential candidate Hillary Clinton has announced her opposition to TPP, even though it was negotiated by a fellow member of the Democratic Party.

Expect a fierce fight on all fronts before the dust settles.

Click here for original piece.

Tanzania's Labour Laws and the EAC

According to sources, the Association of Tanzania Employers (ATE) has disagreed with President Jakaya Kikwete’s position on closing the labour market to other East African nationals. ATE executive director Aggrey Mlimuka said freely allowing skills to flow in will expand the economy, which in turn will create more jobs.

Delivering a speech to the National Assembly recently, President Kikwete said Tanzania’s stand against opening up its labour market in accordance to the East African Common Market Protocol is among the reasons why the country is being sidelined by other member states. The EAC Common Market Protocol was adopted and signed on November 20, 2009, by member Heads of State, and entered into force on July 1, 2010, officially allowing for free movement of labour. Recent World Bank findings show that East Africa would benefit greatly from free trans-border flows of labour, as they would allow for a more efficient allocation of skills that are relatively scarce in some partner states as well as provide employment to idle skill resources in others.

Mr Mlimuka said it was wrong for Tanzania to close the labour market wholesale. He suggested that Tanzania review its laws to allow foreigners to work in the country and complement the weak local labour force. He said Tanzania could stipulate that the foreign worker have a local person understudying them during the contractual period. That way, the local labour force would become competitive across the region. 

It is important to note that the cost of a work permit in Tanzania is $2,000, Zanzibar $150, Burundi charges 30 per cent of the salary; in Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda the permits are issued free of charge to East African nationals.

According to other sources, an ongoing crackdown on EAC immigrants in Tanzania is fueling fresh doubts about the country’s commitment to the East African Community as Tanzania and its partners within the bloc continue to pull in different directions on regional integration.

According to a study titled An Assessment of the Implementation of the EAC Common Market Protocol Commitments on the Free Movement of Workers commissioned by the East African Business Council (EABC) and the East African Employers’ Organisation, Tanzania’s work permit regulations emphasize immigration control measures instead of work related requirements. According to ATE, the cost of work permits and the complicated procedure for their approval are the biggest impediments to free movement of workers into Tanzania. The EABC study reveals that East Africa is facing a middle-level skills vacuum. In Tanzania, for example, middle-level professionals account for only 12 per cent of the total number of professionals in engineering and just six per cent in accounting. According to the Study, "the figures for accounting seem particularly low if compared with Kenya, where accounting technicians exceed the number of qualified accountants by a factor of four. In Tanzania, qualified accountants exceed accounting technicians by a factor of 16,” the research reveals. This means that in Tanzania, for every 16 qualified accountants there is only one accounting technician, the opposite of the normal pyramidal labour structure in a modern economy. In addition, according to the Study, there is a shortage of mid-level skills in most of the EAC.

Last month, the Tanzanian government said it would not waive work permit fees for East Africans seeking jobs in the country until some of the laws to do with immigration, capital flows and security have been assessed and revised.

Kenya's Sugar Sector and COMESA Safeguards

According to sources, Kenya’s sugar sector faces a gloomy future as the end of the COMESA safeguards beckons.

In March 2004, the government requested a four-year cover that was granted with conditions from the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) council of ministers. However, Kenya is yet to meet any of the conditions, and the government now indicates it will be seeking another extension when the current one ends March 2014.

Agriculture secretary Felix Koskei says the government is keen on an extension of the protection. “We will explain to COMESA why we need an extension; we understand that we have exhausted our limits, but we still have the reasons to be given one more extension,” says Mr Koskei.

Kenya has exhausted the required allowance for the extensions as put in place by the COMESA treaty, and it is not clear whether the window will be extended.  The cover came into effect in 2003 and Kenya was given a four-year waiver that would see the importation of duty-free sugar from the COMESA market regulated. Kenya got extensions in 2007 and in 2011. Initially, the treaty would provide for a maximum of eight years, however, the waiver in December 2007 was amended to avoid contravening COMESA Trade Remedy Regulation which provide for a maximum eight years for the application of safeguards under the bloc’s terms.  COMESA reviewed the regulations to be in tandem with the World Trade Organisation’s agreement on safeguards which provides for a total of 10 years for developing economies.

A former chairman with the Kenya Sugar Board (KSB) and currently a director at the agency says political will shall override the COMESA treaty on the protection.  “At the end of the day, political will shall prevail over the treaty; each member country has own interest of protecting their sugar sectors which provides a source of livelihood for more than a million people,” says Mr Saulo Busolo.  Kenya is considered a large-scale consumer of industrial sugar, used in making cakes, sweets and pharmaceutical products, which are later sold within COMESA.  Mr Busolo says Kenyan consumers are paying exorbitant prices for sugar as a result of shielding the local manufacturers from increased competition from neighboring African nations.  “Consumers are parting with high prices in buying sugar compared to other African countries such as Mauritius,” he said, adding that Kenyans were paying more than two times the world average. Mauritius exports all the locally produced sugar and imports cheap sugar from the COMESA market to sell it to its citizens cheaply, he said. 

A World Bank report on Kenya released last week says the protection measures have contributed to making Kenya a high-cost sugar producer, hurting the consumer.The high cost of producing sugar in Kenya is attributed to high cost of farm inputs. Kenya’s average production cost stands at $950 per metric tonne compared to regional countries like Malawi where the cost is as low as $350 per metric tonne.  When the safeguards were granted Kenya was asked to, among other conditions, come up with a formula for paying farmers and sell the State-owned millers. Some of the State millers are Miwani, Muhoroni, Awendo-based Sony, Nzoia, and Chemelil. Currently, the payment is based on a farmer’s supplies and the industry average. According to the COMESA safeguards, the payment would be quality-based judged by sucrose content, not the bulk. The KSB, the industry watchdog, says a pilot is running in Sony and Nzoia. The impending sale of the millers has been delayed for years, the Cabinet having given it a nod in 2010. But it could not take off, partly because there was no law and having the Privatization Commission in place also took a while.

Critics and reviewers, however, have voted overwhelmingly for the sale of the former giants to inject efficiency backed by new investment, talent, and limited political interference.  Before the window closed in the first four years of the first extension, all these millers had a combined debt of Sh50 billion, one of the factors that delayed their sale.  The minister has blamed the delay in privatization on the last Parliament, that, he says, did not give the government the go-ahead. “Parliament did not give the Treasury the privatization go-ahead that would have started early this year,” said Mr Koskei. 

The government negotiated for the COMESA lifeline to allow the importation of 200,000 tonnes to meet the country’s deficit, whose total annual consumption stands at 700,000 tonnes against the local production of 500,000 tonnes.This comes even as the regulator has warned that it will cancel the licences of the sugar factories that would not comply with the sugar policy that requires all the millers to have more than one income generating project. The policy, to be implemented in the next 24 months by the KSB is aimed at protecting the local sugar industry from collapsing in the weight of cheap sugar once the COMESA window closes. KSB chief executive officer Rosemary M’kok says that the 24-month window period is enough time for all the sugar factories to have complied with the requirement. “The factories that would not have complied with our policy will definitely have their licences cancelled as KSB will not renew them,” Ms M’kok said. It would be mandatory for all the millers to produce sugar, ethanol and electricity as a different source of generating income, instead of relying on sugar alone.

Can Africa Feed Africa?

A new World Bank report Africa Can Help Feed Africa: Removing barriers to regional trade in food staples ―says that Africa’s farmers can potentially grow enough food to feed the continent and avert future food crises if countries remove cross-border restrictions on the food trade within the region. According to the Bank, the continent would also generate an extra US$20 billion in yearly earnings if African leaders can agree to dismantle trade barriers that blunt more regional dynamism. The report was released on the eve of an African Union (AU) ministerial summit in Addis Ababa on agriculture and trade.

According to the report “Africa has the ability to grow and deliver good quality food to put on the dinner tables of the continent’s families, however, this potential is not being realized because farmers face more trade barriers in getting their food to market than anywhere else in the world. Too often borders get in the way of getting food to homes and communities which are struggling with too little to eat.”

With many African farmers effectively cut off from the high-yield seeds, and the affordable fertilizers and pesticides needed to expand their crop production, including unpredictable weather patterns, the continent has turned to foreign imports to meet its growing needs in staple foods.

See full report here for some policy considerations.

WB 2013 Doing Business Report on the EAC

The World Bank Doing Business is a tool that measures regulations that enhance business activity and those that constrain it and it also measures regulatory quality and efficiency.

There has been a recognition that regional integration alone is not enough to spur growth. The EAC needs an investment climate—including a business regulatory environment—that is well suited to scaling up trade and investment and can act as a catalyst to modernize the regional economy. Despite the reform efforts of all 5 member economies, the EAC’s average ranking on the ease of doing business has remained fairly constant over the past 4 years, at around 117 and in fact comparing the 2010 Doing Business performance to 2013, the EAC has seemingly not registered much of an improvement. This is a clear indication that critical obstacles to entrepreneurial activity remain and that economies in other regions have picked up the pace in improving business regulation. Improving the investment climate in the EAC is therefore an essential ingredient for successful integration—the foundation for expanding business activity, boosting competitiveness, spurring growth and, ultimately, supporting human development.

The development of regional strategies and institutional frameworks that connect and streamline national reform programs is an indispensable condition for a well-functioning common market that can attract foreign investment. A lack of coordination among member countries and the implementation of “isolated” national reforms—which often focus on short-term gains and fail to consider the impact on the region—can hinder progress in fully implementing the common market. Conversely, continual exchange among different authorities across countries, the implementation of an agreed-on regional reform agenda and a focus on common goals and objectives create synergies and help the region as a whole to improve its investment climate.

Fostering economic growth by tapping the potential of the private sector is among the main objectives of the fourth EAC development strategy. In addition to increasing institutional coordination, other important steps to achieve this objective are better integrating small and medium-size enterprises into the financial sector and creating business-friendly administrative structures and tax regimes. Additional challenges are to ensure the availability of reliable data and statistics and to implement credible surveillance and enforcement mechanisms.

The EAC economies have an average ranking on the ease of doing business of 117 (among 185 economies globally). But there is great variation among them—from Rwanda at 52 in the global ranking to Burundi at 159. This wide variation in business regulations is among the issues that the EAC needs to tackle to achieve the desired level of integration. While the regional average ranking is less than ideal, if a hypothetical EAC economy were to adopt the region’s best regulatory practices in each area measured by Doing Business, it would stand at 26 in the global ranking on the ease of doing business. Burundi was among the world’s most active economies in implementing regulatory reforms in 2011/12. It implemented policy changes in 4 areas measured by Doing Business: starting a business, dealing with construction permits, registering property and trading across borders.

One area where the EAC shows strong performance is business start-up. To start a business in the EAC requires only 8 procedures and 20 days on average. As such the EAC’s average ranking on the ease of starting a business is 84, higher than those of other regional blocs in Africa—104 for the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 110 for the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and 127 for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

The 2013 Doing Business Report on the EAC can be downloaded here.

EAC Industrialization Policy 2012-2032

The EAC Industrialization Policy and Strategy provides general contours of policy intentions and strategic areas of focus to guide EAC towards achieving the set goals and in particular, attaining industrialized economic status by 2032. The EAC Industrialization Policy is intended to address the challenges facing the region particularly, the need to build a more diversified regional economic structure. 

The formulation of the policy was accomplished through a comprehensive and inclusive process, based on analysis and wide consultations with stakeholders in the Partner States. The policy is aligned to the relevant Articles of the Treaty in particular Article 79 and 80 which provide for regional co-operation in matters of industrial development as well as Article 44 of Common Market Protocol in which the Partner States undertake to adopt common principles to cooperate in Industrial Development in the region. 

The Partner States have set themselves ambitious targets to be met within the timeframe, of the policy as follows: 

a) Diversifying the manufacturing base and raising local value added content (LVAC) of resource based exports to 40% from the currently estimated value of 8.62 % by 2032; 

b) Strengthening national and regional institutional frameworks and capabilities for industrial policy design and implementation; and delivery of support services to ensure sustainable industrialization in the region; 

c) Strengthening R&D, Technology and Innovation capabilities to facilitate structural transformation of the manufacturing sector and upgrading of production systems; 

d) Increasing the contribution of (i) intra regional manufacturing exports relative to total manufactured imports in to the region from the current 5% to about 25% by 2032 

e) increasing the share of manufactured exports as a percentage of total merchandise exports to 60% from an average of 20%; and

f) Transforming Micro Small and Medium Enterprises into viable and sustainable business entities capable of contributing up to 50% of manufacturing GDP from 20% base rate.

To address the industrialisation challenges, the following broad policy measures will be undertaken:

1. Promoting the Development of Strategic Regional Industries/Value Chains; and enhance Value Addition

2. Strengthening national and regional institutional capabilities for industrial policy design and management

3. Strengthening the capacity of industry support institutions (ISIs) to develop and sustain a competitive regional industrial sector

4. Strengthening the Business and Regulatory Environment

5. Enhancing access to financial and technical resources for Industrialization

6. Facilitating the development of, and access to appropriate industrial skills and know-how

7. Facilitating the Development of Micro, small and medium enterprises (MISMEs)

8. Strengthening Industrial Information Management and Dissemination Systems

9. Promoting equitable industrial development in the EAC region

10. Developing supporting infrastructure for industrialisation along selected economic corridors

11. Promoting regional collaboration and development of capability in industrial R&D, technology and innovation

12. Promoting sustainable Industrialisation and environment management

13. Expansion of trade and market access for manufactured products

14. Promoting Gender in industrial development.

To exploit the resource endowment in the region and enhance the region’s industrialisation levels, the EAC Industrialisation Policy has earmarked six strategic resource-based industries, in which the region has a comparative advantage and which will be developed to facilitate productive integration (PI) through industrial deepening, diversifying, specialisation and upgrading. The strategic regional industries to be promoted include:

1. Agro processing

2. Iron steel processing and other mineral processing

3. Chemicals (fertilizers and agro chemicals)

4. Pharmaceuticals

5. Energy

6. Oil and gas processing

See the Policy and related documents here.

EAC: U.S. Counters with New Trade Pact

By Business Daily

Kenya and other East Africa economies could witness a huge inflow of investment and development support as the US moves to counter the gains made by the EU and surging Asian nations such as China and India. The US said it is crafting a new incentive-laden trade and investment treaty for the East African Community (EAC), which it has identified as a potential hub to host its regional business interests.

The proposed treaty would mark a major shift in America’s engagement with the region, which at present is anchored on a simple Trade and Investment Agreement (TIFA) signed with the EAC in July 2008. The TIFA’s main role is to strengthen the US-EAC trade and investment relationship, expand and diversify bilateral trade, and improve the climate for business between the two blocs. The framework further seeks to bolster partnerships in initiatives such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act, the World Trade Organisation’s Doha Round of negotiations, trade facilitation and skills building.

The US, however, said it was now pursuing a full treaty with the EAC, just six months after China signed a TIFA with the EAC to promote commodity trade, tourism, investment, infrastructure development and training.

“It is great that other parties such as China are looking more to East Africa and that shows the region has huge potential,” said Mr Camunez US Assistant Secretary for Commerce. “We however cannot hide the fact that America is also interested in the region.  ”China is particularly active in the construction and infrastructure development sector in East Africa and has since branched into other key economic areas such as manufacturing. “I’ve witnessed first-hand the skyrocketing level of investment that has come into Kenya from other parts of the world such as China, India, the Gulf region and elsewhere,” he said. “It’s easy to see why American exporters and investors simply must be more fully engaged.”

To claw back America’s influence in East Africa, President Barack Obama’s administration has taken on a fresh campaign to press for new trade and investment partnership with the bloc. “The proposal calls for the negotiation of a regional investment treaty, the creation of trade enhancing agreements in areas such as trade facilitation, and importantly the establishment of a new commercial dialogue that will facilitate engagement between public and private sectors,” the US official said. Mr Camunez said as part of the deal the US will press for good governance in key areas such as procurement and the adoption of asset protection and intellectual property rights enforcement policies. “We are hopeful that our proposed regional trade package will be accepted by Kenya and the greater EAC and we look forward to deepening our engagement here,” he said.

“Kenya is extremely well positioned to capitalise on this momentum. It holds great potential, enormous opportunity and extra ordinary promise and is a critical hub for American companies in Africa and it offers an important platform and hub for doing business in the continent,” Mr Camunez said.

Kenya hosts more than 60 US firms including giants like General Electric, IBM, Citi, Dow Chemicals, farm machinery maker John Deer, Google, Microsoft, Corn Products, General Motors East Africa and Coca-Cola.  An audit by consultancy firm, Ernest & Young showed that the US was the highest source of new foreign direct investment into projects in Kenya between 2003 and last year.

This move by the US is not surprising. Apart from the EAC-China agreement, we should not forget the EAC EPA with the EU which was initialled, remains unsigned and is still yet to be concluded.

Rwanda-US Bilateral Investment Treaty and the EAC Common Market Protocol

The Rwanda-US Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) was signed in Kigali in 2008 and the United States Senate unanimously approved the treaty on September 26, 2011. Meanwhile, the EAC-US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) was signed in July 2008 between USTR and the EAC.  In addition, the EAC Common Market Protocol (CMP) to which Rwanda is a member came into force into force on 1st July 2010. 


The Rwanda-US BIT is the first to be concluded between the US and a sub-Saharan African country since 1998 (when a BIT was signed with Mozambique). Although there are over 40 BITs in force to which the US is a Party, this Treaty with Rwanda is only the second concluded on the basis of the ambitious 2004 U.S. model BIT. Other African countries with BITs currently in force with the US include: DRC, The Congo, Morocco, Senegal, Egypt, Cameroon and Tunisia. The BIT with Rwanda will remain in force for ten years after its entry into force and will continue in force unless terminated by a Party by providing one year’s advance notice to the other Party. 

The BIT provides investors with legal protections which include non-discriminatory treatment of investors and investments and the right to freely transfer investment-related funds.  Unlike the EAC CMP however, the BIT also provides for prompt, adequate, and effective compensation in the event of an expropriation; freedom from specified performance requirements, such as domestic content or technology transfer requirements; and provisions to ensure transparency in governance. The BIT also gives investors in all sectors the right to bring investment disputes to neutral international arbitration panels.  

In comparison, EAC CMP Article 29 on the Protection of Cross-Border Investments, undertakes to protect investors and their returns in a non-discriminatory manner however the modalities for doing so are not yet finalised. Article 29:3 proposes that within 2 years after the coming into force of the CMP, Partner States will take measures to ensure necessary protections in the Community.


In contrast, the EAC-US TIFA establishes a EAC-US Council On Trade and Investment to monitor trade, identify and remove impediments to trade and investment.

The BIT contains provisions on National Treatment and Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment whereby it protects investors of a Party and their covered investments from discriminatory measures by the other Party during the full life-cycle of an investment, including the establishment phase. Each Party commits to provide to investors of the other Party and to their covered investments treatment no less favorable than that which it provides, in like circumstances, to its own investors (National Treatment) or to investors from any third country and their investments (MFN Treatment). In this instance, Rwanda has committed in the BIT to give US investors similar treatment it is providing to EAC Partner States, in like circumstances, under the Common Market Protocol. 

In contrast however, the EAC CMP Article 13 on the Right of Establishment, EAC States have committed to the principle of MFN but not the principle of National Treatment. However in Article 16 on the Free Movement of Services, the principles of MFN and National Treatment are addressed. Hence National Treatment is applicable in the EAC CMP for investment in the services sectors but seemingly not investment in industrial sectors e.g. agriculture, manufacturing, hunting, and forestry, mining and quarrying, energy production/transmission and distribution. 

On Transfers, the BIT has free transfer obligations which require that a Party permit capital and other transfers related to an investment be made freely both into and out of its territory. Additionally, a Party must permit transfers to be made in a ‘‘freely usable currency,’’ as designated by the IMF, at the market rate prevailing at the time of the transfer. Parties may however prevent transfers through the equitable and non-discriminatory application of certain laws. The EAC CMP on the other hand has provisions on the Free Movement of Capital Articles 24-28 which corresponds to the CMP Schedule on the Removal of Restrictions on Free Movement of Capital (Annex VI).

On Performance Requirements, the BIT prohibits the imposition by the Parties of several requirements relating to the performance of investments, including a requirement to achieve a given level of exports or domestic content or requirements linking the value of imports or domestic sales by an investment to the level of its export or foreign exchange earnings. The Article also prohibits Parties from offering advantages, such as tax holidays, in exchange for a more limited set of performance requirements. In the WTO context, the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) takes a similar prohibitive approach however only in the context of trade in goods. 

So as not to place U.S. and Rwandan investors at a competitive disadvantage, the disciplines on performance requirements also apply to all investments in the territory (non-discrimination) of a Party, including those owned or controlled by host-country investors (domestic investors) and those owned by non-Parties. The EAC CMP does not impose performance requirements however it would seem that by virtue of the BIT, Rwanda cannot impose such measures even in the services sectors vis a vie any third Party. In practice, Rwanda may want as a policy to impose some performance requirements e.g. the technology transfer in targeted sectors, vis a vie more developed countries and justifiably so, in order to meet key development objectives.  This provision is therefore not in the interest of Rwanda given her level of development. It should be mentioned that the development of China is linked to performance requirements (local content) the Chinese government put in place for foreign investors. See related piece here. Fortunately however Rwanda has exempted performance requirements in her Annex II on non conforming measures (discussed below).

On Senior Management and Boards of Directors, the BIT prohibits measures requiring that persons of any particular nationality be appointed to senior management positions in a covered investment. A Party may require that a majority of the board of directors of a covered investment be of a particular nationality, or that a director be a resident of the host country, so long as such requirements do not materially impair an investor’s control over its investment. This provision would prevent Rwanda from implementing broad-based local empowerment policy to foster development of its own nationals into senior management positions and fortunately Rwanda exempted this in her list of non conforming measures (discussed below). Meanwhile in this context, the EAC CMP does not discipline the composition of Boards of Directors and the nationality of Senior Management by virtue of the principles of free movement of workers and right of establishment. The CMP only requires that juridical persons be established in accordance with the national laws of a Partner State.  

In the Publication of Laws and Decisions the provisions in the BIT seek to promote transparency in the legal framework governing investment. It requires the Parties to ensure that laws, regulations, procedures, administrative rulings of general application, and adjudicatory decisions that relate to any matter covered by the Treaty are promptly published or otherwise made publicly available. The EAC CMP contains a mildly similar provision in the Free Movement of Services chapter Article 19 whereby notification is required but not publication and the notification only applies after the introduction of the measure. 

In the BIT, each Party is obligated, to the extent possible, to publish in advance any laws, regulations, procedures, or administrative rulings of general application with respect to matters covered by the Treaty that the Party proposes to adopt, and to provide interested persons and the other Party a reasonable opportunity to comment on the proposed measures. In the EAC CMP, provisions on advance publication and comments are not addressed.  In practice this means that the US would have the opportunity to view, comment  and make recommendations in advance, on Rwanda's proposed laws and regulations however EAC Partner States would not.

On the rules of origin (Denial of Benefits) the BIT establishes that a Party may deny the benefits of the Treaty to an investor of the other Party if persons of a third country own or control the enterprise and the denying Party either (1) has no diplomatic relations with the third country; or (2) adopts or maintains measures, such as foreign policy sanctions, with respect to the third country or to a person of the third country that prohibit transactions with the enterprise or that would be violated or circumvented if the benefits of the Treaty were accorded to the enterprise or to its investments. This provision impacts on third Parties that are on sanctioned lists of either Party.

The provisions on Denial of Benefits also establishes that a Party may deny the benefits of the Treaty to an investor of the other Party if the enterprise has no substantial business activities in the territory of the other Party and persons of a third country, or of the denying Party, own or control the enterprise. 

The Agreement also lists Non-Conforming Measures (equivalent to negative lists) and in these Annexes, each Party lists existing measures to which any or all of four key obligations of the Treaty do not apply, and sectors or activities in which each Party reserves the right to adopt future measures to which any or all of those obligations will not apply. Annex III of the BIT is reserved for financial services NCMs. 

Annex I:

Rwanda: Exemption from MFN and National treatment in all sectors to allow for differential minimum capital requirements for investment registration. Here Rwanda identifies "local investors" to include Rwandese and COMESA investors who are entitled to a lower capital threshold (USD 100,000) than "foreign investors" (USD 250,000). While EAC is not mentioned in the BIT given the common market was not yet in place, one can argue that the EAC falls in the "local investor" category since the common market is technically working towards a single market.

United States: Atomic Energy; Mining; Air Transportation; Customs Brokers; Radiocommunications Licenses; and restrictions on securities registration and OPIC insurance eligibility. 

Annex II 

Rwanda: Preferences for socially or economically disadvantaged communities and differential treatment pursuant to existing international treaties. Here Rwanda reserves the right to adopt  measures in all sectors that are not consistent with the provisions on National Treatment, Performance Requirements and Senior Management and Boards of Directors in order to accord rights or preferences to socially or economically disadvantaged communities. 


Rwanda also reserves the right in all sectors to deviate from MFN provisions in order to adopt or maintain any measure that accord differential treatment to countries under any bilateral or multilateral international agreement in force or signed before the BIT. For agreements signed or in force after the date of entry into force of BIT, Rwanda reserved the right to deviate from MFN treatment with regard to: (a) aviation; (b) fisheries; and (c) telecommunications.  

United States: Radio/Satellite Communications, Cable Television, Social Services, Minority Affairs, measures relating to U.S.-flagged maritime vessels, and differential treatment pursuant to existing international treaties. 

Annex III 

Rwanda: On insurance, Rwanda states that the entry shall cease to have effect on the earlier of: (i) the date that Rwanda enacts an insurance law that eliminates the non-conforming aspects of the measure as set forth above;' or (ii) September 1, 2009.

United States: Financial Services/Banking, Insurance, and general Financial Services. 

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Overall the US has more detailed sector specific Non Conforming Measures than Rwanda especially in the services sectors (transport (maritime, aviation), communication (audio visual, telecom), financial services (banking, insurance and other financial services). However Rwanda also made useful exemptions but at a sectoral level made general carve-outs in insurance, aviation, telecommunications and fisheries.  

The key take away from this comparison is the Rwanda-US BIT is highly asymmetrical and is more ambitious than the EAC CMP. Theoretically it can prejudice the regional processes given its objectives of MFN, National Treatment, Dispute Settlement (including Expropriation, Compensation), Intrusion in Law Making Processes (governance) and broad-based elimination of: performance requirements, empowerment measures including elimination of legitimate development oriented requirements for foreign investment and repatriation. 


Whether such comprehensive coverage is desirable for African countries is an important question, the answer to which is highly context- and situation-specific, and needs to be assessed against the overall objective of ensuring that investment treaties promote investment that actually exists or has the compelling potential to exist and that fosters sustainable development. The propensities to invest and hence the need for protection through an ambitious BIT is an important consideration before signing BITs as such needs may change over time. In closing its important to note that several countries receiving high FDI receipts in Africa e.g. Angola, Sudan have very few BITs and in a previous post we found that strict FDI provisions in BITs do not increase investment.

A Look at Turkey's Trade Policy and FTA with Mauritius

Turkey concluded an FTA with the first Sub Saharan African country, Mauritius, on September 9th 2011 and is expected to initiate negotiations with other EPA and EC FTA signatories.  This is because the customs union between Turkey and the EU, which entered into force on 1 January 1996, has been the main factor shaping Turkey's foreign trade policy.  In addition, the EU opened accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005 and guidance on reform priorities is provided through the Accession Partnership, adopted in February 2008.

In the EU-Turkey customs union, the EU unilaterally eliminated all customs duties and equivalent measures for industrial products and processed agricultural products when the trade-related provisions of the Interim Agreement of the Protocol entered into force in September 1971, whereas Turkey as a developing country was accorded a transition period of 22 years.  

The EC-Turkey customs union also provides for a common external tariff for the products covered, and foresees that Turkey will align its trade-related legislation with the EU acquis in several areas essential for market access, e.g. with respect to product standards.  The customs union covers all industrial products as well as the industrial component of processed agricultural goods, TRIPS, and competition policy, but does not extend to agricultural commodities, services, or government procurement.  The EU however offers Turkey a preferential regime on imports of certain agricultural products. Negotiations on services and government procurement were launched in 2000, but are now part of Turkey's accession process. 

The customs union also provides provision for:

• free movement (elimination of customs duties and quantitative restrictions) 
• alignment of Turkey on the EC common external tariff, including preferential arrangements (even GSP), and harmonisation of commercial policy measures;
• approximation of customs law, and
• approximation of other laws (intellectual property, competition, taxation, etc.)
• the adoption by Turkey of measures equivalent to the EU's common commercial policy

The European Union remains Turkey's most important trading partner and investor.  For instance, the EU accounted for nearly 70% of total FDI inflows into Turkey during 2005-10.  Nearly 40% of its imports come from the EU, and just over 50% of exports go to the EU. Machinery and transport equipment dominate EU imports from Turkey followed by manufactured articles which account for 24.3%. Main EU exports to Turkey are machinery and transport material (45.1%), chemical products (17.1%) and manufactured goods (15.1%).Globally,  Turkey ranks 7th in the EU's top import list and 5th as an export market.  However, the dominance of the EU in Turkey's foreign trade has declined markedly over the last five years, reflecting a notable shift in Turkish exports towards growth markets in its neighbourhood, in North Africa, certain CIS countries, and in Asia. 

Other main Turkish export markets in 2010 were Iraq (5.3%), Russia (4.1 %), USA (3.4%), United Arab Emirates (2.9%) and Iran (2.7%). Imports into Turkey came from other key markets include: Russia (11.7%), China (9.4%), USA (6.7%), Iran (4.2%) and South Korea (2.6%). 

Turkey currently has about 17 FTAs in force which include one with the EFTA countries, Israel, Macedonia (FYR), Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, Morocco Syria, Egypt, Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Georgia, Chile, Jordan, Lebanon and Mauritius.

The Mauritius-Turkey FTA provides enhanced duty free access on most industrial products.  All Mauritian industrial products will enter Turkey duty free with the exception of some 70 lines related to textiles which will be phased on four years.  Mauritius in return will offer duty free access to more than 80% of its tariff lines to Turkish industrial products.  In any case Mauritius is a duty free island with over 80% of applied tariffs at zero. 

Why the exclusion of agricultural products? Turkey, even though a member of the G-33 , ranks amongst the largest agricultural producers in the world and the main crop is wheat of which the country is over 90% self-sufficient. With corn, Turkey is about 80% self-sufficient and is a net-exporter of barley. Other major crops include fruit and vegetables, nuts, tobacco, cotton, and sugar. Turkey is also one of the major milk producers in the world, predominantly for domestic consumption of cheese and yoghurt.  While Turkey has specialized feed lots and dairy farms, and large-scale commercial poultry farms, livestock production is mainly extensive and small-scale.  

Useful to note that Turkish agricultural policy was adopted with a view to aligning it more closely with the EU Common Agricultural Policy.  Turkey's main policy objectives are food security and food safety, and raising the self-sufficiency level for selected net-imported products;  improving productivity and competitiveness;  ensuring sustainable farm incomes;  rural development;  and improving institutional capacity.

For comparison, by the end of 2007, the 6 ESA EPA States: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zambia and Zimbabwe agreed an interim EPA with the EU. Mauritius in that agreement submitted an individual schedule which is annexed to the interim EPA and liberalises 96% of EU imports into Mauritius compared to a liberalisation of 80% with Turkey, possibly due to the inclusion of some agricultural products in the EPA.

What appears unfortunate in the Mauritius-Turkey FTA is that Turkey seems to have offered market access predominately in industrial goods, where Turkey is competitive. However few SSA African countries are neither productive nor competitive in industrial manufacturing. With Turkey being an emerging industrial exporter, the loss of revenue on the import side for African countries could be an area of concern. In agriculture, Turkey provides subsidized support which is equivalent to the EU Common Agricultural Policy.  

The EU Single Market Services Directive

The Directive on Services in the Internal Market (the Services Directive 2006/123/EC) was adopted in December 2006. The Directive liberalises the internal EC services market in that it requires Member States to abolish discriminatory requirements, such as nationality or residence requirements, and particularly restrictive requirements, such as “economic needs” tests (requiring businesses to prove to the authorities that there is a demand for their services). It also requires the review of other burdensome requirements which may not always be justified (such as territorial restrictions or minimum number of employees).

The EU member States were provided a three-year transitional period to transpose the Directive into national legislation. However, several member States missed the end-2009 deadline, and work to implement the Directive continued throughout 2010. The Directive requires the Member States to simplify procedures and formalities that service providers need to comply with. In particular, it requires Member States to remove unjustified and disproportionate burdens and to substantially facilitate: the establishment of a business, i.e. cases in which a natural or legal person wants to set up a permanent establishment in a Member State, and the cross-border provision of services, i.e. cases in which a business wants to supply services across borders in another Member State, without setting up an establishment there. 

During 2010, the Commission was monitoring the implementation by the member States, of both the new legal frameworks adopted in order to implement the Services Directive as well as their efforts to establish operational "Points of Single Contact" (PSCs), notably the online portals providing businesses with information about the requirements and procedures to be complied with, and the "Internal Market Information Systems" facilitating administrative cooperation between the authorities of the member States. The PSCs are certainly the most visible benefit of the Services Directive for businesses. They are meant to become fully fledged e-government portals allowing future entrepreneurs and existing businesses to easily obtain online all relevant information relating to their activities (applicable regulations, procedures to be completed, deadlines, etc.) with the ability to apply online and across borders. 

Although the vast majority of the member States have chosen to implement the general principles and obligations of the Directive through a single act, implementation of the general principles has been carried out through several acts in France and Germany. In addition, all member States have had to amend or abrogate existing legislation to ensure conformity with the provisions of the Directive.

The Services Directive does not harmonize national legislation applicable to the services sector, but obliges member States to screen their authorization schemes to ensure that they are maintained only if non-discriminatory, justified by an overriding reason relating to public interest, and proportionate.

The Services Directive applies to the provision of a wide range of services – to private individuals and businesses – barring a few specific exceptions. For example, it covers: 

distributive trades (including retail and wholesale of goods and services) 

the activities of most regulated professions (such as legal and tax advisers, architects, engineers, accountants, surveyors) 

construction services and crafts 

business-related services (such as office maintenance, management consultancy, event organisation, debt recovery, advertising and recruitment services) 

tourism services (e.g. travel agents) 

leisure services (e.g. sports centres and amusement parks) 

installation and maintenance of equipment 

information society services (e.g. publishing – print and web, news agencies, computer programming) 

accommodation and food services (hotels, restaurants and caterers) 

training and education services 

rentals and leasing services (including car rental) 

real estate services 

household support services (e.g. cleaning, gardening and private nannies). 

The Services Directive does not apply to the following services, which are explicitly excluded:

financial services 

electronic communications services with respect to matters covered by other community instruments 

transport services falling into Title V of the EC Treaty 

healthcare services provided by health professionals to patients to assess, maintain or restore their state of health where those activities are reserved to a regulated health profession 

temporary work agencies' services 

private security services 

audiovisual services 

gambling 

certain social services provided by the State, by providers mandated by the State or by charities recognised as such by the State 

services provided by notaries and bailiffs (appointed by an official act of government). 

The Commission has not drawn up concrete plans to cover the other excluded services. Services activities are in any event always subject to the EC Treaty provisions, notably the fundamental freedoms of establishment (Article 43) and free movement of services (Article 49). The Services Directive applies only to EU (EEA) citizens and legal entities established in the EU (EEA), and does not oblige member States to consider changes applicable to non-EU services suppliers.